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military assets for dealing with revolutionary warfare, terrorism, 
and other threats which could be identified under the rubric, "low-· 
intensity conflict." Elite military units, collectively identified 
as Special Operations Forces (SOF), are examined for the character-
!sties and attributes which promote misunderstanding and mistrust 
about their capabilities. Some analytical distinctions are developed 
which may be useful in defining roles and missions for SOF elements. 
Cultural impediments which may inhibit SOF activities are considered 
as well. Research efforts included interviews and discussion 
with twenty Special Operations soldiers, both active and retired, 
a number of them flag-rank or general officers. As a result of 
his research in this sensitive area, the author concludes that 
military SOF are the most adaptable military forces the United 
States can field for operation in the current and prospective 
low-intensity environment. 
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Introduction 
Two factors have had a truly significant impact on U.S. 
foreign and national security policy since the end of World War 
II: the advent of nuclear weapons and the end of colonialism. 
Weapons of mass destruction have fundamentally altered our ways 
of thinking about warfare and have prompted extensive research 
and considerable national effort to forestall the terrible 
possibilities of their use. The second factor has not affected 
U.S. policy in such a dramatic way, but it does pose vexing 
problems that cannot be circumvented through negotiation and 
technological innovation. 
Deterrence posture is vital to U.S. national security because 
societal survival is not merely one of a competing set of options. 
It is compelling, therefore, that we prepare strategic nuclear 
doctrine and nuclear capabilities for the various possible scenarios. 
Below strategic warfare, however, no clean line of demarcation 
exists to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, particularly as 
tactical instruments during a high-intensity conventional war, 
thus the fear of escalation both lessens the likelihood of their 
employment and deters conventional conflict. In that sense, U.S. 
and NATO policy is vindicated; that is, deterrence works. Moreover, 
the terrible toll modern conventional warfare may take on combatants, 
civilians, property, economies, and. political structures bas 
dictated prudence while complementing the nuclear threat in 
raising the threshold for conflict to high levels. When conflict 
does occur, especially at lower levels, it is most likely to be 
found in the Third World. 
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The end of the colonial era has brought about the emergence 
of many new actors on the international stage. Internal dif fi-
culties, historic differences with regional neighbors, and develop-
mental problems have beset many of these predominantly Third 
World states and turned them into breeding grounds for conflict. 
Since the developing world offers new markets and numerous resources 
to the world at large and serves as a source of instability, 
it has become a laboratory for competing ideologies and political 
systeas as well as the focus of intense interest by more developed 
countries. In a strategic sense, the evolutton of these states 
is becoming critical to U.S. national ~ecurity interests. Should 
we ignore them, their problems may increasingly impinge upon our 
interests. 
The United States, as a maritime nation, is particularly concerned 
with the relationship between emerging states and the protection 
of vital sea lanes. In that regard, conflicts in certain regions 
may affect U.S. interests rather markedly. To avoid association 
with colonialist postures and to affirm sensitivities to nationalism 
and state sovereignty, the U.S. must exercise considerable skill 
in dealing with conflict situations in these areas. In the 
future, traditional U.S. military approaches which are focused on 
conventional combat power and high-technol-0gy weapons systems 
will be even less viable for Third World conflicts and their 
associated problems, particularly since many of these conflicts 
3 
are likely to be unconventional in nature. New techniques, 
doctrine, force structure, and command, control, and coordination 
mechanisms should be developed to provide a more effective interplay 
between U.S. agencies and assets at home and abroad. 
Before we can·consider fresh approaches, however, we must 
establish an analytical framework within which conflict and U.S. 
politico-military preparations for it can be discussed. Today, 
certain forms of conflict have begun to predominate, such as 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and subversion. 
Placed on a spectrum, they might appear as follows: 
Normal-Coercive Revolutionary Strategic 
Diplomacy/Subversion/Terror/Guerrilla War/Conventional War/Warfare 
Activities at the lower (i.e., left) end of this spectrum 
may overlap or occur as tactical appendages to conflicts of 
higher intensity. As we move from left to right, the numbers of 
potential nation-state actors diminish to a few at the strategic 
warfare level. In recent years, only a few states have been 
willing to accept the consequences of involvement in high-intensity 
conventional warfare (e.g., Iraq v. Iran). At the left of the 
spectrum, scenarios and participants become almost as varied 
as the imagination ~llows, because the risks of involvement are 
considerably lower. Beneath the mid-high intensity conventional 
level, conflicts are inherently more political and psychological 
than military, though they may have violent military overtones. 
The term which has been applied to strife at the lower end 
of the spectrum is "low-intensity conflict" {LIC), a concept 
which seems to defy definition, because it may be best described 
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by what it is not. Although LIC may have been born of our deterrence 
posture, it has little to do with conventional or strategic 
warfare, even though it may become strategic in its impact on 
U.S. interests. The built-in ambiguities of LIC baffled the 
U.S. in Vietnam and are continuing to challenge the development of 
policy to cope with these phenomena, particularly considering 
U.S. cultural notions of peace and war and what seems to be a 
national affinity for clear-cut choices. 
Several recent events have prompted an accelerated U.S. 
effort to come to grips with LIC: the Iran hostage crisis, the 
bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. Two salient points are relevant to these examples. 
The first is that there are striking differences between the 
milieus and actors involved. While one involved a superpower 
intervention and has resulted in a protracted revolutionary war, 
another involved the seizure of diplomats and embassy personnel 
by revolutionaries and had the eventual sanction of the ascendant 
revolutionary government. 
Under a broad definition of LIC, a staggering number and 
variety of scenarios. are possible; therein, perhaps, lies an 
inherent weakness in the term. A second point, from a policy 
perspective, is more important. A common thread seems to run 
through the three examples: all had a shock effect on U.S. policy. 
Considering that many events which may be described as LIC are 
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low-profile activities, where murky intentions and role-denial is 
the norm (e.g., Nicaraguan/Cuban support for El Salvadoran guer-
rillas), a general U.S. awareness primarily of high-impact events 
suggests that conceptual problems may hamper U.S. approaches to 
LIC. 
Further study of the evolving nature of conflict must be 
conducted in an effort to categorize and draw distinctions, such 
as between events which have state sponsorship (e.g., 1986 Berlin 
disco bombing) and those which are symptomatic of revolution 
(Iran hostage crisis). Distinguishing revolution from other 
forms of conflict is critical to the development of sound U.S. 
policy.I Were the purpose of this thesis to provide such dis-
tinctions or to analyze forms of conflict, it would be fruitful 
to continue in this vein. Nonetheless, we must think carefully 
about what we may mean by LIC, break it down into digestable 
elements, and attempt to develop consistent definitions at the 
policy level, as elusive as they may seem. 
The ambiguity o~ LIC ~as ~parked debate within the Reagan 
Administration over proper U.S. responses, notably in the case of 
state-sponsored terrorist attacks. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar 
Weinberger and Secretary of State G~orge Shultz have been publicly 
at odds over this issue. Weinberger has expressed fear of collateral 
damage, a euphemism, as he calls it, for "how many women and 
children you are going to kill• in responding to terrorist attacks. 
I Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian's work in this area is exceptional. 
For example, see Sam c. Sarkesian, ed. Revolutionary Guerrilla 
Warfare. Precedent Publishing: Chicago, 1975. 
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Moreover, he is concerned that U.S. troops may be committed 
to situations without popular support, reflecting, perhaps, 
latent Department of Defense post-Vietnam sensitivities. Shultz, 
on the other hand, has adopted an unusual position for a diplomat 
by lamenting that the U.S. may become "the Hamlet of nations" by 
not striking back against terrorists.2 
Each position has some merit, and there may yet be a syn-
thesis to their views. The American public must understand the 
reasons for U.S. involvement in certain types of conflict, par-
ticularly those of a protracted and revolutionary nature; otherwise, 
a lack of popular support for U.S. objectives will severely limit 
U.S. options. National policy-makers may feel a sense of urgency, 
however, about altering perceptions of U.S. credibility in dealing 
with attacks on its citizens, affronts to its national prestige, 
and assaults on its vital interests. This debate is only beginning. 
By examining the Presidency of John F. Kennedy, we can 
develop greater insight into the current milieu. Kennedy recognized 
that Third World conflicts, encouraged by the Soviet Union, would 
pose peculiar problems for the U.S •• Perhaps he was too far 
ahead of his time, for he pushed the development of military 
assets suited to the tasks of nation-building and unconventional 
2 See background bibliography. Although this debate has 
received intense press scrutiny, the positions of these advocates 
•ay not be so distinct, since the underlying reason for U.S. 
inaction is probably a lack of in-depth intelligence. Another 
factor is that some terrorist groups train in heavily populated 
areas (Qum, Iran, a religious pilgrimage site is one example). 
Moreover, penetration of such groups would be extremely difficult, 
as they utilize sophisticated cell structures. 
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warfare. Kennedy, alarmed by Khrushchev's avowed support of 
revolutionary wars, saw the U.S. Army Special Forces as the 
ideal resource for counteracting Soviet-inspired '"wars of national 
liberation:1 With Kennedy's death, DoD emphasis on developing 
special warfare capabilities waned; not surprisingly, 'the emphasis 
upon Special Forces in Vietnam shifted correspondingly and took 
on a more conventional orientation. In that regard, Kennedy's 
advocacy of special warfare demands serious study, for it holds 
poignant lessons for the 1980's •. 
As in 1960, the U.S. is poised to resuscitate its special warfare 
capacity, now known as Special Operations Forces (SOF). It seems 
that misconceptions and misunderstandings concerning SOF have 
continued in abundance; traditional resistance to these forces 
has not abated with time. To complicate matters, the U.S. is 
attempting to develop SOF capabilities and doctrine simultaneously, 
without the benefit of a strategy or even a clear definition of 
the problem (LIC) at hand. 
Today's world is more complex than was Kennedy's of 1960; 
state-sponsored terrorism, for example, a political weapon bearing 
psychological results far out of proportion to the acts committed, 
is a relatively new LIC phenomenon presenting serious challenges 
to the formulation of U.S. policy. Perhaps a greater challenge 
3 Several works are excellent in this area. Douglas Blaufarb's 
The Counterinsurgency Era, The Free Press: New York, 1977, provides 
insight into the conceptual and field development of counterinsurgency 
thought. Arthur Schlesinger's A Thousand Days, Fawcett Premier: New 
York, 1965, and David Halberstam 1 s The Best and the Brightest, 
Fawcett Crest: New York, 1972, offer insight into Kennedy's 
tenure in office and the attitudes of those surrounding hia. 
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to U.S. leaders is the need to enhance public awareness of the 
threats to U.S. interests posed by revolution, terror, and subversion. 
Our culture seems to understand threats only in a black-white 
dichotomy; gray conflicts, or the shadow warfare of LIC, lack the 
clarity which we seem to crave (e.g., American identification of 
Muammar Khadafy as the epitome of terrorism). 
This thesis will address the assumption that has run through 
the developaent and redevelopment of SOF -- that these elite 
units are our best military assets for LIC. It is comprised of 
three chapters: SOF Development; SOF Characteristics; The SOF 
Individual. The first chapter discusses the lineage of special 
operations, stressing factors which have influenced conventional 
military perspectives on SOF. Kennedy's advocacy of special 
warfare is central to this chapter. The second chapter draws out 
operational characteristics which distinguish SOF from conventional 
forces, and it explains why SOF is removed from the philosophical 
core of the military mainstream. The third chapter focuses on 
the attributes of the SOF soldier and examines why his adaptability 
suits the changing requirements of the LIC environment. 
An underlying theme in this thesis is that U.S. cultural 
impediments may inhibit public and military-wide understanding of 
SOF activ~ties and the nature of LIC. In each chapter, some 
analytical distinctions are developed which should prove helpful 
not only in defining SOF but also in determining roles and missions. 
If such distinctions are not made at this early stage of the 
redevelopment process, the U.S. will risk misapplication of its 
Special Operations Forces, which seem to be its best military 
assets for low-intensity conflict. 
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Chapter I. SOF Development 
The United States military has a long history of success in 
war. Not surprisingly, lessons learned from those wars have 
carried over into philosophy, doctrine, and planning for future 
conflicts. In its major wars of the twentieth century, WWI, 
WWII, and Korea, the U.S. had time to exploit its vast industrial 
base to develop the capability to overwhelm enemy forces and to 
destroy their economic infrastructures. Although the Korean 
conflict was a limited war from the U.S. perspective, it refined 
the WWII approach because it involved large troop movements, 
heavy applications of firepower, and a taxing drain on American 
and enemy resources. Also common to these conflicts was an 
institutional reinforcement of the perception that U.S. military 
objectives could be met by the approach employed in each, one 
which depended heavily upon mass and concentrated firepower. 
The notable exception from this list is Vietnam because the 
unconventional nature of that conflict frustrated an American 
strategy based on attrition. The Vietnam conflict is an excellent 
prism for observing the relationship between conventional and 
special operations forces as well as the nature of low-intensity 
conflict. Certain aspects of the early and pre-Vietnam period 
which particularly pertain to SOF will be examined in this chapter. 
This chapter will discuss the evolution of SOF by focusing 
on their WWII and post-war lineage, developing important distinctions 
between special operations units, and examining the cyclical 
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advocacy which SOF seem to receive. Emphasis will be placed on 
the Army Special Forces and the development of Army special 
warfare capabilities, although other forces will be discussed 
where they are pertinent. A history of SOF is beyond the scope 
of this thesis; but the nascent years of SOF hold the keys to 
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understanding the halting and often confusing developments in DoD 
special warfare capabilities. By reviewing SOF origins, this chapter 
will grapple with what may be the underlying reasons for misunder-
standing and antipathy towards SOF from regular military forces. 
Long before the U.S. began to develop a powerful industrial 
base and, with some reluctance, a larger role in world affairs, 
it engaged in several conflicts in which some military forces 
relied on stealth, mobility, and surprise to achieve their objectives. 
Examples include Major Robert Roger's Rangers of French and 
Indian war fame, Francis Marion's partisans during the American 
Revolution, and John Mosby's Confederate Rangers during the Civil 
Var. In all three examples, the activities of such groups were 
not critical for the achievement of political goals by the primary 
combatants, but they·served to redress some of the imbalances in 
respective military capabilities. 
The weaker antagonists utilized such organizations out of 
practical necessity, and in that sense ignored some of the traditional 
consensus of opinion on what was ·fair" in war. For example, the 
unconventional approaches of Roger's Rangers during the French 
and Indian War were of ten misunderstood and ~ound contemptible by 
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allied British officers. 1 Francis Marion, the "Swamp Fox" of 
South Carolina, was one of a number of Americans successfully 
utilizing irregular warfare tactics during the American Revolution. 
Frustrated by Marion's elusiveness, one British officer exclaimed, 
"Marion would not come out and fight like a gentleman and a 
Christian.·2 During the American Civil War, Mosby's Rangers played 
havoc with Union supply lines, siphoned off large quantities of 
equipment for Confederate forces, and continually foiled attempts 
by Federal forces to ensnare them. Despite their difficulties 
with Mosby, Union successes in the Civil War encouraged development 
of a U.S. military attachment to an attrition style of warfare. 
In that conflict, an industrially developed North eventually 
overwhelmed a resource-poor South. 
In the twentieth century. major land wars have been fought 
with the assistance of large industrial capacities and a reliance 
upon large troop manuevers and massive firepower. For the American 
Army, industrial capacity and military power have become symbiotic; 
we have relied on this relationship to overwhelm the opposition. 
Economic might, then~ is ideally suited to an attrition strategy. 
Tremendous resources and technological sophistication have provided 
the u.s. with great strength for modern warfare, but they have 
dulled memories of a revolutionary and sometimes unconventional 
1 Robert w. Black (U.S. Army Rangers), •The Beginning of the 
American Ranger,· Gung-Ho Magazine, Charlton Publications, Inc.: 
Derby, CT, October 1984, P• 21. 
2 Frank Barnett, et.al., eds. Special Operations in US 
!trategy. National Defense University Press: Washington, D.C., 
1984, p. 21. 
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military past. Moreover, America depends upon maximizing weapons 
systems to minimize human loss in modern warfare, for we place 
great value on the lives of our soldiers/citizens. To quote 
General Fred C. Weyand: 
War is death and destruction. The American way of 
war is particularly violent, deadly and dreadful. We 
believe in using "things" -- artillery, bombs, massive3 firepower -- in order to conserve our soldiers' lives. 
America has wielded its industrially-based firepower with great 
effectiveness in modern conflicts, decisively ending the global 
contest of WWII with conventional combat power and a newly discovered 
atomic weapon. By the same token, American tactics in major 
conflicts have deemphasized less destructive or personal means of 
combat, the political and psychological nuances of war, and the 
complex skills necessary for deterring conflict at its lowest 
levels. 
In spite of its total nature, WWII spawned the development 
of modern U.S. special warfare. While the U.S. girded its industries 
and military for battle, European and Pacific island nations 
relied to some extent on partisan organizations in order to cope 
with well-prepared and determined occupying powers. 4 The nascent 
U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a civilian organization 
developed for intelligence collection and analysis, was utilized 
3 Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. 
Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 
1983, p. 25. Chapters II and III further develop this line of 
thought. 
4 See F.O. Kiksche's Secret Forces. Faber & Faber, Ltd.: 
London, 1950. This is an excellent source for understanding 
wartime underground movements. 
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to coordinate and to implement U.S. approaches to guerrilla 
or unconventional warfare operations.5 It is noteworthy that 
unconventional warfare and other "unmilitary" activities were 
handled by a civilian organization. To the chagrin of regular 
military forces who saw themselves fighting the "real war," the 
OSS received glamorous press accolades and personal attentio~ 
from President Roosevelt, neither of which discouraged the development 
of a rivalry between OSS and military forces.6 
Some guerrilla groups were troublesome and uncontrollable, 
as they sought to fulfill separatist ambitions or engaged in 
nefarious criminal activities. 7 Wartime relationships with such 
organizations cast Americans into the seamy side of war, especially 
since guerrilla organizations often found the naturally clandestine 
infrastructure of criminal organizations to be valuable.a 
5 See Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its 
Origins. National Defense University Press: Washington, D.C., 
1982, pp. 34-35. See also Bradley F. Smith. The Shadow Warriors: 
OSS and the Origins of the CIA. Basic Books, Inc.: New York, 1983. 
6 Paddock, op. cit., pp. 30-32. Roosevelt lent an open ear 
to OSS Chief William Donovan and provided support to the fledgling 
organization, setting a precedent which President Kennedy later 
followed. 
7 Some guerrilla/partisan groups (not limited to WWII) have 
seen the dislocation of central governments as an ideal opportunity 
to achieve longstanding political aims. Such situations have 
sometimes discouraged military leadership from seeking to cultivate 
partisan resources. Moreover, in revolutionary situations outside 
of major conflicts, where political ambiguities abound, discerning 
the intentions of such groups and evaluating the propriety of 
their leadership may prove to be difficult (e.g., Sandinistas 
and FDN in Nicaragua; FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA in Angola). 
8 Lt. General William P. Yarborough, USA (ret.), former 
commander, u.s. Army Special Warfare Center. Personal Interview, 
Southern Pines, NC, November 9, 1985. 
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To command and control guerrilla forces and retain their 
allegiance in wartime requires special skills. A perspective 
that such forces are of dubious value to the outcome of the 
conflict might preclude any desire to develop those skills. It 
seems that the unconventional operations of the OSS and foreign 
counterparts in WWII were not doctrinally central to U.S. war 
plans because these activities, in the final analysis, will not 
win a major conventional war, whether they are total wars such as 
WWII or limited conflicts as in Korea. 9 
In addition to OSS operations in WWII, American commando 
troops were trained to perform direct action or strike missions 
and to assist in or spearhead conventional operations. Tracing 
their origins to Roger's Rangers, the WWII Rangers became the 
quintessential combat troops. In that war they earned tough 
reputations, as Darby's commandos "led the way" in the now-famous 
Allied assaults on the German positions at Normandy. Ranger 
concepts, which were taught to superior troops in a demanding 
environment, were drawn naturally from conventional combat doctrine, 
though they put a premium on self-reliance and focused on small unit 
tactics. Colonel Darby sought to maximize the effects of intense 
training on his special unit but to minimize symbols of eliteness 
by forbidding his Rangers to wear the distinctive beret worn by 
9 Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA (ret'd.), former DDO-CIA 
and DDIA, Personal Interview I 2, Crewe, VA, October 9, 1985. 
See also (as noted in Paddock, op. cit.) Harry Howe Ransome, Central 
.!_ntelligence and National Security. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, 1958, PP• 64-65. 
16 
British and European commandos. 10 Darby chose, then, to emphasize 
the G.I. nature of his troops rather than what was different 
about them. 
Despite their secondary roles in WWII, both unconventional 
and commando forces augmented conventional operations by attacking 
strategic targets, reconnoitring enemy-held areas for tactical 
and strategic intelligence, and operating or organizing movements 
in rear areas. During America's major wars, an affinity for 
firepower and an attrition-based strategy seem to have precluded 
a comprehensive understanding of the value of unconventional and 
commando capabilities for use in war. For the ·violent peace· 
which we call low-intensity conflict, wartime legacies have left 
the U.S. organizationally, doctrinally, and philosophically 
ill-equipped to conduct the types of warfare LIC demands. Moreover, 
the contrast between the commando operations of Rangers and the 
guerrilla organizational activities of the OSS has been lost on 
many observers because the post-WWII era thoroughly intertwined 
the concepts. Later organizational and doctrinal confusion 
became almost inevitable byproducts. 
Following WWII, some U.S. military leaders recognized a need 
for wel~trained military elements to conduct unconventional 
IO James J. Altieri, "Darby's Rangers,· Gung-Ho Magazine, 
op. cit., P• 59. The significance of the beret in the assimilation 
of special operations units will be examined later in this chapter. 
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warfare behind the lines of a conventional war in Europe. 
Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, supported by Lt. Colonel 
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Russel1 Volckmann, Colonel Aaron Bank, and others, championed the 
development of these forces during the Korean conflict, at least 
partly out of frustration with the lack of CIA-Army coordination 
in clandestine activities. Born in 1952 as an outgrowth of 
the Psychological Warfare Center, the Army Special Forces (SF) traced 
their origins to WWII operations by the OSS, but, as Colonel 
Paddock has noted in his book, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its 
Origins, SF adopted the First Special Service Force (organized 
for arctic and other special operations) and the Rangers into its 
officia1 lineage. 12 Brigadier General Don Blackburn put it in 
blunt fashion: "Special Forces have always been the bastards of 
the Army.-13 Though SF officially evolved from the Rangers, the 
concepts underlying their respective operations are fundamentally 
different. 
Upon the creation of SF, many OSS veterans drifted into 
military service; others went to work for the progeny of their 
parent organization, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). From 
11 SF was probably conceived as a strategic element of a 
"roll-back" strategy. But after the failure of _many CIA covert 
operations in Eastern Europe, the utility of SF in its partisan 
organization role may have become suspect. 
12 Paddock, op. cit., P• 23. 
13 Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn, USA (ret'd.), former 
SACSA to JCS at the time of the Son Tay Raid in 1970. Personal 
interview, McLean~ VA: November 13, 1985. General Blackburn was 
not ref erring specifically to SF origins but was speaking about 
general perceptions of SF. 
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that standpoint, some traditional soldiers looked upon the association 
between Special Forces, OSS, and the CIA with suspicion, wondering 
whether the practices of these uncpnventional groups and their 
unusual cast of operators had anything in common with warfare 
as our military professionals had come to know it. Moreover, the 
subsumption of SF under the Psychological Warf are center clouded 
distinctions between the roles and missions of SF and Psychological 
Operations units.14 
Although unconventional warfare, as practiced by SF, may 
involve the direct action and strategic reconnaissance missions 
normally associated with commando operations, most SF activities 
are ~rganizational and educational in nature. They may even 
include civic action projects such as medical care, construction, 
and teaching. Because SF operate in an alien and sometimes hostile 
environment for extended periods, it is essential that they 
understand the milieu and, naturally, the host language of the 
area in which they might work. Rangers, on the other hand, 
conduct primarily direct action or strike missions (as well 
as tactical or strategic reconnaissance). The short duration of 
their missions requires minimal regional understanding and area 
orientation. 
These distinctions would seem self-evident, but they have 
not always been understood and applied by the conventional estab-
lishment which commands them, perhaps because commando or strike 
14 Barnett, op. cit., PP• 240-244. 
extensively discusses the organizational 
Forces to Psychological Warfare. 
Paddock, op. cit., 
marriage of Special 
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operations devolve· from conventional perspectives and military 
traditions whereas SF operations (with their OSS roots) do not. 
Within SOF units, there is sensitivity toward these distinctions. 
The recent creation, then, of counter-terror strike forces (i.e., 
units operating within the Joint Special Operations Command) is 
more in keeping with U.S. military tradition than are forces 
oriented toward revolutionary environments (as represented by 
. SF).15 Even counter-terror developments have been confusing, 
though, since the underlying concept behind the creation of Delta 
Force, the Army's counterterrorist unit, pointed to the development 
of a multi-purpose special warfare force similar to the British 
Special Air Service (SAS). 16 An American tendency toward special-
ization and its impact on SOF will be discussed in the conclusion 
of this paper. To shed more light on military special warfare 
development, other military units should be examined, particularly 
since many LIC contingencies would require joint SOF missions 
and an inter-service cooperation which, historically, has not 
been well-coordinated. 
The Navy's SEALs (an acronym foi Sea, Air, and Land) were 
developed from WWII-era Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT s), but 
15 Sam c. Sarkesian, ·American Posture for Low Intensity 
Conflicts: Misconceptions, Misdirections, and Organizational 
Ambiguity,• pp. 35-36. Delivered at the Airpower Symposium, Air 
University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Karch 1985. 
16 There are, however, unique requirements for counter-terror 
operations. Colonel Charlie Beckwith provides insight into the 
background and development of Delta Force for counter~terror (CT) 
missions in his book, co-written with Donald Knox, Delta Force. 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: San Diego, CA, 1983. 
20 
they were cultivated during the Kennedy push for special warfare. 
Therefore, they trained for riverine and coastal operations which 
could effectively deny guerrillas their havens and supplies. 
SEALs developed a fearsome reputation in their multi-purpose 
roles during Vietnam. Unlike Army SF, who sometimes advised 
South Vietnamese forces, few SEAL operations in Vietnam were of 
an advisory nature; their roles, in that regard, bore some resemblance 
to those of the British SAS in Malaysia during the 1950's.17 
Since then, however, SEALs have refocused on "blue-water" operations 
such as reconnaissance, obstacle clearance, and sabotage as 
opposed to "brownwater" activities such as counter-revolution. 
As one SEAL officer has said: 
The SEALs have had to focus on providing operational 
support of the Navy's fleets, especially since the end 
of Viety3m combat; it's an organizational survival issue 
for us. 
In contrast to the Navy, Air Force special warfare developed 
with a guerrilla orientation, due to the many resupply missions 
which the "Air Commandos" flew for OSS operators and foreign 
17 A non-attributable conversation with an active-duty 
enlisted SEAL was helpful. He argued that though SEALs are 
currently training foreign naval commandos (El Salvador) and may 
play roles in protracted conflicts, their primary orientation is 
toward strike missions (including, of course, reconnaissance) in 
support of Navy (and Marine) objectives. Therefore, SEAL operations 
would seem to have more in common with the Army Rangers than with 
the Special Forces. As with the Army, the development of a counter-
terror SEAL team flows naturally from their origins as direct 
action elements. 
18 Quoted (non-attributed) in Colonel August G. Jannarone, 
USAF, "Towards a National Operational Philosophy for the Employment 
of Joint Special Operations Forces.· Written under the auspices 
of the Senior Seminar, U.S. Department of State. Rough draft, 
June 1986, P• II. 
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nationals in support of WWII regional objectives. In Vietnam, 
their missions were varied though often in a ground support role, 
hence the development of gunships such as the AC-47 and the 
Spectre. Because of the Air Force's strategic warfare considerations, 
however, SOF missions have been considered a minor concern within 
the Air Force, and equipment essential for low-profile or clandestine 
penetration missions has not always been in a high state of readiness, 
strangely enough, even following the collapse of the Iran rescue 
attempt.19 Low-technology transfer, training techniques, counter-
insurgency, and civic action -- all potentially important Air 
Force roles in LIC -- have received even less attention than have 
airlift capabilities. 
Within the Army, aviation needs have long been oriented 
toward ground missions. For that reason, Army SOF aviation has 
been developed to fill gaps left open by Air Force SOF, especially 
for short-range, rotary-wing (helicoptor) missions. Shortfalls 
apparent in the Iran mission as well as a debilitated CIA paramilitary 
capability prompted the inception of Task Force 160th, a secretive 
aviation battalion based at Fort Campbell, KY. While the Air 
Force has retained certain missions and ordered new aircraft, 
Army aviation has indicated a willingness to accept new and more 
19 Debates over Air Force SOF missions are at the forefront 
of the modern build-up. For a better understanding of this 
problem, see September-January 1985-86 issues of Armed Forces 
Journal International. For long-range penetration missions, 
state-of-the-art equipment is an imperative, so doctrine must be 
carefully developed to avoid the compromise/failure of missions. 
See also The Role of AirPower in Low-Intensity Conflict, 4 v., 
Airpower Symposium, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: March 
1985. 
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diverse responsibilities if they are given resources adequate for 
their development. 20 The issue of SOF aviation has even captured 
the attention of Congress, but it has not yet been resolved. 
In many ways, these Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF units are 
similar in their orientation toward combat, though the substantial 
role differences between protracted (SF) and strike (Rangers or 
Delta Force) elements must be considered. There are, however, 
other more distinguishable units which are currently considered 
to be SOF. They are Army Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) and 
Civil Affairs units. Both trace their roots to WWII, where they 
had considerable wartime missions. That legacy has relegated 
much of their manpower base to reserve units. In their SOF 
relationship, both are well-suited to protracted conflicts, 
though they may support (PSYOPs primarily) strike operations. 
PSYOPs units have a dual lineage, drawing both on a formal 
development under the Army's aegis and on the influence of OSS 
operations during WWII. As noted earlier, SF emerged as PSYOPs' 
•poor cousin• at the Psychological W~rfare Center at Fort Bragg, 
NC; their organizational wedding complicated the development of 
either as a distinct entity. This situation has presented problems 
for the utility of PSYOPs as national strategic assets and in the 
early years probably inhibited the development of the Special 
20 There is legitimate concern that Army aviation could not 
fill critical preparedness gaps during an interim phase-out of 
rotary-wing (helicoptor) Air Force SOF. The solution will probably 
come from an enhanced Army role for short-range missions, with 
long-range penetrations of hostile airspace left for the time-being 
with the Air Force. 
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Forces concept.21 Their relative positions changed in'the 1960's, 
as PSYOPs became the weaker partner to SF, an alignment which has 
22 continued to the present. 
With a close special warfare relationship, PSYOPs will 
undoubtely encounter coordination problems which will hamper U.S. 
efforts to develop themes designed to promote regional and inter-
national psychological objectives. To compound PSYOPs problems, 
Americans seem to feel that something is inherently •dirty• about 
psychological activities, particularly those associated with 
warfare. Likewise, unconventional warfare and other SOF-related 
terms seem to be distasteful to many Americans. So SOF semantic 
difficulties go beyond definitions in that the related terminology 
may strike a cultural nerve. 
The original subsumption of special operations units under 
the PSYOP umbrella (and the modern reversal) may stem from General 
William Donovan's conception of the value of unconventional 
warfare..!!.!. a psychological weapon •. His comprehensive views 
contributed heavily to the developme~t of CIA paramilitary capa-
bilities -- which, interestingly, are also called special operations 
-- and to a psychological or propaganda apparatus within the 
CIA. 2 3 
21 
247-249. 
To the chagrin of military proponents such as General 
Barnett, op. cit. (article by Colonel Paddock), PP• 237-245, 
22 Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, USA, U.S. Department of 
State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, former Commander, 4th 
PSYOP Group. Personal Interview, Washington, D.C.: November 29, 
1985. See also Paddock, op. cit., P• 146. 
23 Ibid., P• 35. 
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McClure, the CIA sought to develop the Special Forces idea itself; 
that situation should tell the perceptive student that PSYOPs and 
SF activities were not necessarily considered to be endemic to 
the military profession, at least not by non-military members of 
24 the national security establishment. 
Besides PSYOPs, Civil Affairs units are the other unusual 
elements referred to as SOF. Like PSYOPs, they would play critical 
wartime roles in support of overall objectives, because they have 
unique capabilities for reorganizing war-torn areas. They demon-
strated their value to expeditionary types of missions in the 
recent Grenada operation, and they have performed cooperative 
roles with the Agency for International Development (AID), the 
CIA, and other government agencies during Vietnam and less publicized 
conflicts.25 They offer special resources for either protracted 
(revolutionary guerrilla war) or short-term (expeditionary) LIC 
environments, though they are less applicable to strike operations. 
Civil Affairs and PSYOPs units are geared for high-intensity 
warfare, yet they have retained such close association with 
special warfare that they are considered to be SOF. Since both 
are oriented toward political, social, and psychological ends 
the characteristics most central to LIC PSYOPs and Civil 
Affairs should be at forefront of a SOF renewal. Yet, Reagan 
Administration interest in SOF has been so focused on counter-
24 Ibid., also pp. 130-133. 
25 See Barnett, op. cit., (chapter by Douglas Blaufarb), 
pp. 207-220. 
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terrorism and strike operations that leadership perspectives on 
SOF are likely to become one-dimensional, that is, skewed toward 
a commando concept, if only from a lack of awareness of other 
possible SOF roles and missions. These non-combat units have 
probably not received attention commensurate to their potential 
LIC roles, and until that situation is addressed and reversed, 
particularly in an organizational sense, critically valuable 
SOF assets may be underdeveloped. 
The reader should realize by now that there are some important 
distinctions which must be made in order to maximize U.S. SOF 
assets. Organizational confusion has certainly contributed to 
the circuitous development of special operations capabilities, 
but it is not the only reason for slow SOF growth and a lack of 
acceptance by conventional forces. Because few flag-rank officers 
have been exposed to SOF and most with SOF experience have been 
unable to retain associations with SOF units, a lack of effective 
special operations advocacy within.u.s. military leadership has 
led to a "benign neglect" of SOF. 26 
SOF has long been perceived within ~he military as a "career 
ki1ler;"27 as one author described the status of SF in the 
1960's, "Special Forces were known to be a dead end for anyone 
26 Letter from Lt. General Carl H. Cathey, USAF, Vice-Commander 
of USAFE, December 15, 1985. 
27 
"Military Special Operations,· ABC News Nightline 
transcript, November 22, 1985, P• 2. 
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who aspired to a high rank.· 28 Despite a lack of professional 
incentive, many SOF soldiers have chosen to risk slow career 
development to remain with their units. Chapter III will discuss 
the individual traits which propel this tendency. For all the 
former difficulties, these forces have survived to the present to 
become the subject of intense interest by policy-makers, as in 
the early years of the 1960's. That period holds insight into 
the bureaucratic challenges of advocating and developing SOF. 
In 1960, President John F. Kennedy took office and began a 
personal campaign to build a U.S. capacity for counteracting 
·wars of national liberation" or Soviet-suppo~ted insurgencies 
and guerrilla wars. In a speech to graduating West Point cadets 
in 1962, Kennedy said: 
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, 
ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives, 
insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; 
by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory 
by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging 
them •••• It requires a whole new kind of strat~gy, •wholly 
different kind of military training.29 
Kennedy found military leadership reluctant to respond to 
his efforts to develop a doctrine for •counterinsurgency," for 
few military leaders shared his perception that a new and different 
kind of warfare had come into being. Even his Special Military 
Representative for counterinsurgency, Genera1 Maxwell Taylor, 
. . . looked on the counterinsurgency business as a faddish distraction 
28 Loren Baritz, Backfire. William Morrow and Company, 
Inc.: New York, 1985, p. 242. 
29 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation. Doubleday & Company, 
Inc.: Garden City, NY, 1967, P• 412. 
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from the main responsibility of training for conventional assault.- 30 
Most military leaders viewed new capabilities as superfluous to 
those already in existence; General George H. Decker, Army Chief 
of Staff 1960-62, said, ·Any good soldier can handle guerrillas.·31 
General Taylor made similar comments which reflected the military's 
confidence in its institutional preparation for conventional 
warfare and its occasional guerrilla facet. To their credit, 
those viewpoints are credible in the context of a total war, in 
which population security and political repercussions are not 
primary concerns. It seems, then, that President Kennedy and 
military leaders were not operating from the same conceptual base. 
Kennedy took a personal interest in the U.S. Army Special Forces 
(SF), the elite element of the U.S. military which was at that time 
oriented toward partisan organization in wartime Europe. He believed 
that these guerrilla warfare experts could shift to a counter-
guerrilla role and thus offer a riposte to Khrushchev's challenge. 
The weak military underpinnings of .modern U.S. unconventional 
warfare experiences have already been pointed out; yet, General 
Decker stated confidently in reference to SF preparation for 
counter-guerrilla warfare that ·similar units were used considerably 
during WWII •••• This is not something new. It's something in 
30 Schlesinger, op. cit., P• 318. 
31 Drawn from Captain (now Major) Andrew Krepenevich's 
unpublished thesis, •The United States Army and Vietnam: Counter-
insurgency Doctrine and the Army Concept of War,• West Point, NY, 
1982, p. 25. 
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which the Army has quite a bit of experience.· 32 Actually, 
the U.S. Army had little modern experience at that time in counter-
guerrilla warfare and virtually none in coping with the highly-
organized cadres of communist revolutionary movements. 
The prevailing logic which drove Kennedy's promotion of SF 
was that "it takes a bandit to catch a bandit,•33 despite assurances 
from the conventional military that counterinsurgency was really 
a "hammer and anvil" concept best conducted by conventional 
forces as in the Indian wars of the American west. 34 Again, 
General Taylor: 
It (counterinsurgency) is just a form of small 
war, a guerrilla operation in which we have a long 
record against the Indians. Any well-trained organ-
ization can shift the tempo to that which might be 
required in this kind of situation. All this cloud of 
dust that's coming out of the White House really isn't 
necessary. 35 
In developing a Third World counter-guerrilla orientation, 
SF adopted a posture far apart from its original intent, and one 
which traditionalists considered to be unnecessary for the task 
of counterinsurgency. But Kennedy viewed the LIC problem as 
spanning arenas outside of the normal military purview, and he 
therefore "insisted that the Special Forces be schooled in sanitation, 
32 From files of the Center for Military 
D.c., Interview with General George H. Decker, 
World Report, Kay 29, 1962, PP• 67-68. 
History, Washington, 
U.S. News and 
33 Interview, Blackburn, op. cit •• See Chapter II section 
(5) for an explanation of the relevance of SOF-criminal associations. 
34 Donald Duncan. The New Legions. Random House: New York, 
1967, pp. 201-202. 
35 Krepenevich, op. cit., P• 25. 
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teaching, bridge-building, medical care and the need for economic 
progress,· all of which deviated considerably from the original 
SF mission. 36 
Kennedy's conception of SF as a sort of •peace Corps with 
guns• never caught on within the military mainstream, though SF 
were often utilized in that fashion during the early years (1960-64) 
of Vietnam, largely under CIA auspices. After the deaths of 
Kennedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, "Operation 
Switchback" reverted SF operations to military control. With the 
introduction of American combat units, SF roles were shifted to 
support conventional operations. 37 Other special warfare units 
which had blossomed during Kennedy's counterinsurgency campaign 
also withered in the face of an increasingly conventional approach 
to the conduct of the Vietnam war. 
It seems that "topside" political fixes to SOF have been 
impermanent because of a lack of intra-military advocacy; even 
such a powerful SOF political benefactor as Kennedy could not 
foist revolutionary ideas on a DoD devoted to clearly-defined 
threats. Perhaps the advocacy problem does lie outside of the 
military, since the fundamental orientation of the American 
military is toward conventional and strategic warfare. In that 
sense, it is unfair to expect men whose full-time job is to 
prepare for conventional or strategic warfare to understand and 
36 Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 318. See also preface by Lt. 
General William P. Yarborough in Charles Simpson, Inside the 
Green Berets. Presidio Press: Novato, CA, 1982. 
37 Interview I 2, Wilson, op. cit •• 
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prepare for the intracacies of Lic.38 Viewed through conventional 
lenses, today's low-intensity conflicts may seem no different to 
U.S. military leaders than they did to General Earle Wheeler, 
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who declared author-
itatively in 1962: 
It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the 
problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and 
economic rather than military. I do not agre~g The es-
sence of the problem in Vietnam is military. 
In sum, SOF development. has been a tortuous process in which 
there has been little conceptual consistency. Moreover, most 
conventional leaders have viewed special operations as an adjunct 
to the conventional mission. These leaders did not consider SOF 
to be useful tools for counteracting new threats, probably because 
they were either unaware of low-intensity threats or did not 
believe that LIC was different enough from conventional warfare 
to warrant development of specialized forces. In addition to 
these issues, SOF characteristics seem so foreign to "regulars· 
that they promote resentment toward SOF by the mainstream. 
What operating characteristics distinguish SOF from conventional 
forces? Are these forces so divergent from conventional norms 
that they do not belong in the military? Why have some observers 
suggested attaching SOF to the CIA, creating a sixth military 
service, forming a Unified Command, or placing SOF under the 
38 Interview, Yarborough, op. cit •• 
39 Hilsman, op. cit., P• 426. 
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aegis of a separate DoD body, such as a Defense Special Operations 
Agency? It seems likely that the latter may occur soon; the 
advantages and limitations to each approach are now under debate 
in Congress. 40 The second chapter, then, will review those factors 
which allow differentiation between SOF and conventional forces, 
and it will discuss the operational characteristics which make 
SOF applicable to LIC. 
40 See Dan Daniel, •A Sixth Service for Special Operations?" 
Armed Forces Journal International, Washington, D.C., August 
1985, Sen. William S. Cohen, R-ME, •A Defense Special Operations 
Agency: Fix for an SOF Capability that is Most Assuredly Broken,· 
Armed Forces Journal International, January 1986, and Noel Koch 
and J. Michael Kelly, "Two Cases Against a Sixth Service ••• for 
Special Ops,· Armed Forces Journal International, October 1985. 
Chapter II. SOF Characteristics 
Why may it prove necessary to create a separate agency as 
a home for U.S. military SOF assets? Why did President Kennedy 
find advocacy of SF such a challenge and military leadership 
reluctant to comply with his wishes? Why did Colonel Beckwith's 
efforts with Delta Force in the 1970's meet resistance and disdain? 
In reviewing SOF origins, we can find some of the answers. By 
examining these eleven salient characteristics of SOF operations, 
all of which contrast sharply with conventional operations, the 
reasons may become even more apparent. 
(1) SOF rely on speed, stealth, and surprise to achieve objectives. 
Operating in small units, they utilize low profiles to avoid 
being targeted by superior firepower. Surprise, given an 
imbalanced troop ratio, is essential to SOF success. 
(2) Secrecy is of the essence for SOF. Without it, their greatest 
strengths are compromised. In other w~rds, informed adversaries 
can be deadly to SOF. 
(3) SOF operate symbiotically with intelligence assets for the 
above reasons, and they may fall under CIA operational 
control periodically, especially for clandestine missions. 
(4) SOF operate primarily at night to accentuate their strengths. 
(5) SOF depend upon individuals. NCO's and enlisted men, not 
colonels and generals, may make critical field-decisions. 
They are, conceptually, not unlike CIA operatives in that 
they implement U.S. policy in the field. 
(6) SOF operate on the periphery of military norms, and they are 
often involved in unusual and secret activities. Therefore, 
they tend to develop something of a romantic "outlaw" image. 
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(7) Some SOF are attuned to a particular political-cultural milieu 
and may need specialized area-training and linguistic abilities 
because their activities may focus on political, social, and 
psychological goals rather than solely on military objectives. 
(8) Many SOF activities have unusual requirements, often making 
special equipment and logistics necessary. The operators 
are likely to attempt something which bas not been attempted 
before. In that sense, every special operation is unique. 
(9) Peacetime SOF missions (the LIC environment) can take on a 
politically supercharged nature, especially hostage-rescue 
and other direct action missions. A conventional estab-
lishment rooted in the American polity would rather not 
take the discredit for failed operations (e.g., the Iran 
mission). 
(10) Due to their saall size, intense training, and the operations 
they conduct, SOF are military elites. They may drain off 
the best and most "warrior-oriented" men from line units. 
(11) Most important, perhaps, is that SOF activities are a form 
of military martial art which might be more closely associated 
with the writings of Sun Tzu than those of Clausewitz. 
It will be useful at this point to examine each of these character-
istics in greater detail. 
(1) SOF ground elements such as SF, Rangers, and SEALs emphasize 
small unit tactics and attempt to accomplish their objectives 
through clandestine infiltration/exfiltration and surprise. 
Because SOF are not generally mechanized units (perhaps with the 
exception of Delta Force, whose logisitics may necessitate a 
semi-mechanized status), these soldiers are highly mobile. They 
usually work in small teams, often comprised of 16 or fewer 
men. All of these units emphasize self-reliance and coping with 
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unusual eventualities. In that regard, standard operating procedures 
(SOP) can inhibit the flexibility required for special operations 
and detract from preparations for specialized SOF tasks; many 
solutions to special operations problems could not appear in a 
manual designed for general digestion. 1 In the case of advisory 
support for a nation involved in counter-revolutionary or counter-
insurgency activities (note: these are not synonyms because 
insurgents may not seek to disestablish the social and political 
order), SF might keep a low profile, perhaps by operating in 
civilian garb, but they would not necessarily depend upon stealth, 
except for organizing ambushes. 2 For Ranger. counter-terror, 
and wartime SF aissions, surprise is an obvious requirement, one 
which"is supported by clandestinity. 3 
(2) Because so many of their operations are secret, SOF tend to 
be clannish, like employees of the CIA. Clandestinity promotes 
suspicion within the mainstream, a situation exacerbated when 
cooperation between conventional and unconventional forces is 
1 Dr. Alan F. Farrell, Professor of French, Hampden-Sydney 
College, USAR, SF. Personal Interview, Hampden-Sydney, VA, 
December 1986. Self~reliance as a SOF trait or individual 
attribute will be discussed in Chapter III. 
2 With the recent assassination of SEAL Schaufelberger in 
El Salvador, obvious American presences may be drawn down to the 
point that stealth practically becomes an advisory characteristic. 
3 Extraordinary secrecy surrounds SOF units (see I 2). In 
hostage situations, a decision to use force could imperil hostages 
if the captors were aware of an impending assault. For examples 
of operational security considerations, see the Holloway Report 
on the Iranian rescue mission or various accounts of the German 
rescue at Mogadishu. 
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necessary. Vietnam is replete with examples of conventional 
officers arriving in their operational areas to find SF soldiers 
who could not brief them because of operational security requirements. 
From a policy standpoint, ~ecrecy may be necessary or desirable 
to permit a U.S. role-denial, especially when a host nation 
or revolutionary movement would rather not acknowledge outside 
assistance. While secrecy may help to promote low profiles, it 
may also stimulate a converse effect of enhanced public and press 
curiosity. 4 Although largely left unsaid, there are also deep-seated 
fears in this country of secret, highly-trained, politically-astute 
military elites; the book Seven Days in May, a 1950's novel, 
considered the possibility of an American coup d' etat by such 
forces.5 Congressional oversight and press leaks have seriously 
limited the viability of "covert" CIA operations and may eventually 
affect SOF in a similar fashion. It seems that a cultural aversion 
toward secrecy may have an impact on the utility of SOF in clandestine 
missions. 
(3) In conventional combat operations, mistakes can be redressed 
by throwing in more troops, utilizing increased firepower, or changing 
tactics/maneuvers. In other words, these operations usually can 
be attempted again with a different approach. In the special 
4 Proponents of SOF have sought some of the publicity 
of the current build-up to enhance public awareness of the need 
for these forces and because of retrenched organizational resistance 
to SOF development. 
5 Interview # 1, General Wilson, op. cit •• 
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operations arena, particularly for direct action missions, there 
6 is rarely a chance to regroup for a second attempt. SOF, 
therefore, must have a timely and accurate intelligence flow. 
Without it, the chances for special operations successes are 
minimal. In the case of the Iran mission, DoD was forced to 
place its own agents in Tehran; the CIA strip-down during the 
1970's contributed to that dilemma and raised questions about 
intelligence support for special operations. 
For SF operations, information about the political climate 
may be critical. For SOF aviation, military and civilian intelligence 
resources must study hostile radars to discern the best in/exfil-
tration routes and landing sites; they may also evaluate targets 
~ 
and help to determine mission requirements through both human and 
technical means. 7 Intelligence support for PSYOP and Civil 
Affairs efforts can be critical as well. PSYOP units must understand 
population targets, ethnic characteristics, and regional pecul-
iarities. In Civil Affairs operations, restructuring of shattered 
areas and dislocated populations would not be effective without 
a thorough understanding of the people and milieus involved: 
where "hearts and minds" rather than military forces are the 
6 Ibid. 
7 The Soviets would delight at revealing U.S. clandestine 
operations to their surrogates or to any state hostile to the 
U.S., hence, the need for recognition of Soviet ELINT and EW · 
capabilities, as well as those within target states. For SOF 
aviation, then, coordination with NSA and all other intelligence 
resources is essential. The U.S. raid in 1970 on the Son Tay 
prison camp in North Vietnam is an excellent case study of this 
challenge. 
37 
center of gravity, civic action operations should not have to 
rebuild the chaos created by heavy firepower.8 
Quality intelligence of a tactical and strategic nature is 
necessary for the effective use of SOF assets. Like SOF, American 
intelligence resources must coordinate with host intelligence 
services and help to improve their effectiveness in supporting 
indigenous forces and American SOF. 9 Ironically, the abortive 
CIA Bay of Pigs operation, which raised questions about the CIA's 
ability to command large paramilitary operations, was a catalyst 
in the I960's development of SOF. Despite National Security 
Action Memorandum's 54-57, which sought to clarify the respective 
domains of CIA and SOF, SOF and intelligence activities may 
coincide or overlap at points, requiring a "baton pass" for a 
transition from an intelligence to a military operation. For a 
IO 
successful "pass," an earlier relationship must exist. 
SOF personnel (usually SF) have been placed under CIA operational 
control from time to time, a situation which makes conventional forces 
nervous and dual command and control relationships uncertain.II 
8 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam. Oxford University 
Press: New York, I978~ p. I56. Lewy discusses the heavy American 
reliance on firepower and its fundamental asymmetry to counter-
insurgency and small-unit operations conducted in civilian environ-
ments. 
9 The Phoenix effort at destroying the Vietcong infrastructre 
(VCI) in Vietnam is a noteworthy study. See Stuart Herrington's 
Silence Was a Weapon. Presidio Press: Novato, CA, I982. 
IO Inte~view I 2, Wilson, op. cit •• 
II A recent Washington Post article, entitled "Army's 
Covert Role Scrutinized" reflects the CIA-SOF association fears, 
November 29, I985, p. AI,s,9. See also, Eliot Cohen, Commandos 
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For example, during the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. Army attempted 
to prosecute the commander of the Fifth Special Forces Group, 
Colonel Bob Rheault, and some of his men .for the alleged murder 
of a suspected Viet Cong informant. Since Rheault and his men 
were under CIA auspices at the time and the Agency was reluctant 
to cooperate, the case was dropped, but not without some reper-
cussions. 12 Given Congressional dispositions and national 
attitudes of the 1970's toward CIA, press revelations of such 
relationships foster an unwarranted fear of "spooks" which can 
damage U.S. objectives. 13 It may be that our cyclical affinity 
for CIA and SOF may be reachin.g a pinnacle, and for that reason, 
promote less mistrust of either.14 
and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies. 
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1978. 
12 See John s. Berry. Those Gallant Men:: On Trial in 
Vietnam. Presidio Press: Novato, CA, 1984. As Berry notes, 
many in SF felt that General Creighton Abrams was venting his 
personal enmity for SF and attempting to discredit them through 
the case. The case could also be considered an example of why con-
ventional forces are inapplicable to unconventional conflicts, 
because certain activities in LIC which may be practical to its 
successful prosecution may defy democratic norms. 
13 Personal Interview with Ted Lunger, House Armed Services 
Committee, Staff of Rep. Dan Daniel, D-VA, former U.S. Army Special 
Forces. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1985. 
14 Frank Klingberg has pointed out the cyclical nature of U.S. 
approaches to foreign policy by identifying introvertish and 
extrovertish phases. On a related note, Harry Howe Ransome has 
discussed CIA in terms of cultural reactions to perceptions that 
U.S. interests are being impinged upon abroad. In that sense, he 
asserts that Americans assent periodically to "letting the Agency 
loose" like a watchdog, a thought which could also be applied to 
SOF. See Harry Howe Ransome, "Strategic Intelligence and Intermestic 
Politics," Charles w. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. 
Perspectives on American Foreign Policy. St. Martin's Press: New 
York, 1983, PP• 299-319. 
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(4) Most SOF units conduct nighttime operations to utilize their 
main strengths -- stealth and surprise. Conventional units may 
operate at night, but only rarely. It is interesting to note 
that night operations, like amphibious and arctic operations, 
were referred to as special operations in 1951; the term ·special 
operations· was then supplanted by ·special forces operations· 
which in turn became "unconventional warfare.·15 Despite confusion 
over definitions, there is general agreement among students of 
this subject that SOF activities are usually conducted at night. 
In revolutionary guerrilla wars or insurgencies, the night 
is usually the province of the guerrilla; to meet him on his 
ground, SOF must train in that environment and learn to think 
like the guerrilla (the rationale for developing SF for the 
counter-guerrilla mission). Only highly motivated units will 
operate at night, so in order for SF to train indigenous forces, 
locals must have a stake in the success of operations and in the 
solvency of their government -- South Vietnamese Provincial 
Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), comprised of local elements, were 
such forces.16 Likewise, strike units such as SEALs, Rangers, 
and Delta Force usually operate at night to enhance their effective-
15 Paddock, op. cit., p. 139. The 1983 conference which 
led to the publication of Special Operations in U.S. Strategy was 
an assembly of the foremost thinkers in this area, yet no conceptual 
and definitional synthesis came out of it. The papers published 
in that work reveal varying ideas about the nature of Special 
Operations. 
16 Interview H 1, Wilson, op. cit •• 
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ness. 17 SOF aviation, with their low-level flights and tricky 
maneuvering, can be especially hazardous at night; 18 Army SOF 
aviation (known as the "Hightstalkers-) goes by the motto, ·neath 
Waits in the Dark.· An unforeseen enemy can strike fear into the 
hearts of adversaries. SOF capitalize on human fears about the 
unknown, as do terrorists and guerrillas. 
(5) Another element of American society besides military SOF prefers 
operating at night --criminals. Chapter I briefly discussed the 
symbiosis between a clandestine criminal infrastructure and SOF 
attempting to penetrate a closed or hostile society. SOF association 
with black marketeers and other criminals may be useful though 
undesirable linkages for operations in a totalitarian environment.19 
On the other side of the LIC coin, Reagan Administration officials 
have argued that the Soviets and their surrogates make use of 
organized crime in the form of drug-dealing to support and conceal 
their operations. Some LIC problems certainly emanate from those 
relationships (e.g., narco-terrorism in Colombia and Bolivia). 
Guerrillas or insurgents, terrorists, and subversives are 
themselves likely to be considered illegal, at least as far as 
17 The Grenada operation holds numerous examples of problems 
which may ensue when SOF attempt to coordinate with conventional 
forces which have little sens~tivity to SOF requirements in this 
area. 
18 Colonel Ray E. Stratton, USAF (now ret'd.), former 
Commandant of the USAF Special Operations School. Personal 
Interview: Crystal City, VA, October 1985. 
19 Interview, Yarborough, op. cit •• 
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threatened governments are concerned; for example, Chiang Kai-Shek's 
efforts to rid China of Mao Tse-Tung and his communist movement 
were known as "Bandit Suppression" campaigns. SF of the early 
1960's were frequently referred to as "bandits,· at least in the 
context of catching guerrilla "bandits." Perhaps such associations 
have encouraged American cultural reservations about SOF (especially 
the terminology applied to them) and the nature of LIC -- that 
is, that both are unfair, unsavory, immoral, and somehow illegal.20 
In a legalistic society with a strong sense of moral propriety, 
such perceptions reduce the viability of SOF and the effective-
ness of U.S. LIC approaches. Legal principles, of course~ set 
norms for behavior within society and tend to reflect mainstream 
societal viewpoints. When those norms are ignored or violated, 
the law is invoked. Because special operations may violate 
cultural norms, they may activate a cultural perception that 
special operations are inherently "illegal." Those same legal 
and moral parameters can be so confining, though, that SOF may 
appeal to a romantic "outlaw" image ~n American society. In his 
book Military Elites, Roger Beaumont identified the propensity on 
the part of elite forces to develop an outlaw self-image.21 
Nonetheless, SOF operations fall outside the realm of military 
normalcy and the society it reflects, so SOF unconventionality 
may tend to be equated with outlaws. 
20 Hays w. Parks, Office of the Adjutant General of the 
Army, Personal Interview. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 1985. 
21 Roger A. Beaumont. Military Elites. The Bobbs-
Merrill Company: Indianapolis, IN, 1974, P• 192. 
(6) When SOF deploy, particularly in LIC situations, enlisted 
men, not officers, are the focal point. For that reason, many 
conventional commanders cringe at the thought of an SF sergeant 
making critical field decisions, especially since NCO's and 
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enlistees are not traditionally recognized for their decision-making. 
The command, control, and communications (C3) aspect, then, of 
SOF operations is important to consider. Conventionallyoriented 
military leaders who know little about the nature of SOF and 
their unique capabilities may misuse these forces. As noted 
previously, few military leaders would want to shoulder the 
responsibility for the failure of special operations, especiallly 
when they must delegate considerable authority to the field. 
Structural changes which would allow SOF officers greater control 
of their operations would seem logical. Again, however, flag-rank 
SOF officers are few in number. 
Individuals are critical to special operations success, not 
numbers as is often the case with conventional operations. Too 
many operators could be counterproductive to a special operation 
due to the low-profile nature of the operations. SF operations 
in particular depend on the individual and his creativity. SOF 
promotion of self-reliance will be discussed in Chapter III. It 
may be that U.S. problems with LIC stem from a limited understanding 
of the necessity of effective individuals, both our own soldiers 
and the foreign nationals with whom they might work. 
A national penchant for quantifying problems sidesteps the 
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individual human element and the often subjective nature of LIC. 
That tendency may challenge the development of the understanding 
needed for the U.S. to succeed in the microcosmic arenas in which 
it might use SOF.22 A statement on Vietnam in 1962 by then-Secretary 
of Defense Robert s. McNamara is indicative of that perspective: 
"Every quantitative measurement we have shows we're winning this 
war." 23 Vhile empirical data may be of use for studying LIC 
phenomena, LIC seems to have a subjective nature which can frustrate 
a technologically-developed and quantitatively-oriented nation. 
Like intelligence assets, SOF can provide an unquantifiable 
on-scene interpretation of events which cannot be supplied by national 
technical means. 
(7) Of course, any military undertaking, to follow Clausewitzian 
logic, has political underpinnings and an essentially political 
objective. In LIC, however, political and psychological goals 
surge to the forefront and military operations may take the 
backseat, emerging only to complement or punctuate other goals. 
SOF are well-suited to that environment. Political awareness is 
especially pertinent to those SOF operations requiring cooperation 
with indigenous peoples. Since the U.S. military is traditionally 
22 Major Thomas Custer, USA, JSOA, 7th SF Group, Personal 
Interview. Washington, D.C.: November 1985. Custer highlighted 
his point by explaining that in SF demolition operations, the 
"P" factor (for our purposes, •p• for plenty) may get the job 
done when it is difficult to determine how much explosive to use. 
For example, Colonel "Bull" Simons doubled the charges his demo-
lilitions men ·thought to be enough for the Son Tay raid. 
23 p. 412, Hilsman. 
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circumscribed in American politics and is considered an apolitical 
servant to the state, conventional forces may not be attuned to 
or interested in the political nature of LIC activities or of the 
significant roles often played by military forces in Third World 
politics. 
To be effective in interacting with foreigners and in attempting 
to assimilate foreign cultures, SF, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs units 
have special needs for language training and area-orientation. As 
noted, strike and protracted operations are fundamentally different, 
so that Rangers and other strike operators have less need for 
languages and area skills. There are, however, instances in which 
those skills could be useful to strike forces, such as for cross-
trainLng and instructive purposes and for counter-terror operations 
dependent upon foreign assistance.24 
(8) SOF may need unusual equipment, often inaccessible through 
ordinary procurement channels. For example, during preparations 
for the Son Tay raid into North Vietnam, planners encountered 
numerous problems attempting to obtaih suitable equipment, such 
as night sights for their rifles. 25 Colonel Beckwith experienced 
24 Considering that Delta Force has advised foreign forces 
in several publicized instances,. language capabilities may be 
useful for them as well. The refined nature of hostage rescue 
and other direct action special operations demands literally that 
nothing be lost in translation. 
25 For numerous examples, see Benjamin Schemmer, The Raid. 
Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1976. 
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many of the same obstacles in attempting to outfit Delta Force. 
SF, by contrast, ·probably relies less on equipment than other 
troops. They are trained to improvise and scrounge •••• They 
don't need sophisticated weapons.·27 Because technology is such 
an American strong suit, technological solutions to misunderstood 
problems are alluring. 
SOF equipment may have to be tailored to .the unique requirements 
of the situation, sometimes because their needs are too primitive 
for up-to-date military acquisitions. As Arthur Schlesinger 
noted in A Thousand Days: 
The professionals, infatuated with the newest tech-
nology and eager to strike major blows, deeply disliked 
the thought of reversion to the rude weapons, amateur 28 tactics, hard life and marginal effects of guerrilla warfare. 
Though SOF needs for certain specialized missions may be 
more exotic than those generally required by SF, neither has a 
potential equipment pool which is likely to be of standard issue 
and which may be requisitioned through normal channels. Therefore, 
a flexible procurement program and .developmental process which 
extends beyond or bypasses bureaucratic processes would be practical 
for SOF. Unusual requirements and non-standard (and sometimes 
secretive) methods inevitably work against the grain of bureaucratic 
procedures, and they may raise questions about the propriety and 
legality of SOF acquisitions. For example, a number of recent 
26 See Beckwith, op. cit •• 
27 Blaufarb, op. cit. (quoting General Yarborough), p. 79. 
28 Schlesinger, op. cit., P• 318. 
cases brought by the Army have accused SOF of accounting impro-
prieties. 29 
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(9) Because foes may not be clearly defined, there is a pervasive 
ambiguity to LIC. When SOF are used in these situations, there 
is no guarantee of success or of popular sentiments in support of 
U.S. involvement. A democratically-based Army such as ours 
reflects those feelings; military leadership, then, has little 
desire to engage forces in what may be politically "loaded" 
events. Within the military, there is acute awareness of this 
. 
issue for noone wants association with a botched operation which 
embarrases our country. 
High-profile special operations can make or break careers, 
within and without the military. For instance, it is not hard 
to imagine how the 1980 Presidential election could have been 
affected by a successful rescue of the U.S. hostages held in 
Iran. It takes courage to take the risks of special operations; 
they are high-risk, high-gain affairs~3 0 Though SOF units are 
willing to take the risks in the field, our political and military 
leaders must develop a better understanding of SOF limitations 
and capabilities to be able to use them with wisdom.31 Decision-
29 See Washington Post, op. cit •• 
JO Letter from Colonel Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith, USA 
(ret'd.), former commander of Delta Force: November 11, 1984. 
Jl In retrospective looks at Vietnam, some military leaders 
have criticized what they saw as excessive civilian control of a 
military problem. · On the other hand, few civilian leaders of 
consequence had developed an understanding of the nature of the 
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making for today's special operations missions may be quite 
time-compressed, so it is imperative that political leaders be 
i f d d d f SOF i . 32 n orme an prepare or cont ngencies. 
(IO) Elites run counter to the precepts of a democratic society, 
so they create special assimilation problems within the military. 
Elitism, to some observers, can damage overall troop morale by 
focusing attention on a few and spiriting away the best talent 
and most ·warrior-oriented· men from line units. For the types 
of operations SOF conduct, however, exceptional training and high 
morale is essential, because SOF must feel that they are capable 
of incredible feats. When exceptional men are pooled and trained 
together, elitist attitudes are difficult to avoid.33 Conventional 
commanders would rather not allow their best soldiers to follow 
the siren song and attraction of SF, Rangers, or Delta -- it is in 
their parochial interest, then, to reduce elites to a common 
denominator. SF, for example, takes only Sargeants (E-6's) and 
above; these quality NCO's could fill manpower slots in the 
mainstream. Yet, conventional leadership can be incredulous that 
conflict comprehensive enough to offer something different. 
As U.S. military commitments stepped-up, the special warfare 
community, which probably could have offered alternative ap-
proaches to the conflict, became even more circumscribed by the 
bureaucracy. 
32 For example, Britain•s Margaret Thatcher is involved in 
some SAS training operations. By contrast, American President 
Jimmy Carter did not make his first visit to Delta Force's Fort Bragg 
headquarters until after the failure of the Iran mission. 
33 See Cohen's Commandos and Politicians and Roger Beaumont's 
Military Elites for further analysis of the elite factor. 
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SOF acceptance standards are too high for many men within the 
military mainstream. As Donald Duncan pointed out about the low 
acceptance rates into SF during the early 1960's: 
Regular Brass ref used to believe that such a large 
percentage of men in the Regular Army were academically 
unqualified ~~d decided that the fault lay with inferior 
instruction. 
In the 1970's, Colonel Charlie Beckwith even encountered resistance 
within the special warfare community in his efforts to recruit 
for Delta Force, apparently because of fears that the new unit 
might drain other special operations units. Such fears, then, 
are not endemic only to conventional forces.35 
Symbols of elitism, however, have always been anathema to 
the mainstream. President John F. Kennedy's sanction of the 
weari~g of the green beret by SF was an official, albeit civilian, 
legitimation of an elite symbol abolished during the 19SO's; 
ironically by Kennedy's Special Group (Counterinsurgency) Chairman, 
General Maxwell Taylor.36 Since most military leaders were 
unreceptive to Kennedy's counterinsurgency overtures anyway, his 
sanction of the beret must have further irritated traditionalists. 
Considering Colonel Darby's eschewment of a Ranger beret during 
WWII and longstanding Army proscriptions against special headgear 
and other elite symbols, distinctive berets probably provoked 
resentment for SF by conventional forces, some of whom lampooned 
34 Duncan, op. cit., P• 191. 
35 Beckwith, op. cit., PP• 107-114. 
36 Blaufarb, op. cit., pp. 79-80. 
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the SF "green beanies.· 37 As a way of watering down an exclusive 
symbol, military leaders later allowed other military SOF and 
even airborne units to wear various types of berets. Such symbols 
undoubtedly have created assimilation problems for SOF. 
(11) It seems that the foundations of modern warfare rest upon 
traditional or European thought, that is, upon the reading of 
Clausewitz. Although Clausewitz's intentions could be debated, 
the modern applications have been clear. From an.American per-
spective, his adage about war as a continuation of politics by 
other means has probably been considered an aberration, because 
we seem to consider warfare to be an abhorrent state. Perhaps 
Clausewitz did not see the total application of national resources 
as the final extension of politics. Whatever the case, SOF operations 
seem to devolve from a different perspective, one which places more 
emphasis on the individual, the shrewdness of leaders, the psych-
ological strength of adversaries, and an indirect approach to 
warfare. The writings of Chinese author Sun Tzu on warfare seem 
closely aligned with SOF activities. 38 Mao Tse-Tung drew heavily 
on Sun Tzu for his principles of guerrilla warfare and People's 
War, as did Ho Chi Mirih and General Giap in Vietnam. Perhaps, 
37 David Stirling, founder of the British Special Air 
Service, discovered that a distinguishing beret promoted resentment 
by regular soldiers (and started many a bar fight to boot). See 
Cohen, op. cit., p. 55. ' 
38 Sarkesian, manuscript, op. cit., p. 25. See Sun Tzu's 
The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford University 
Press: London, 1963. 
50 
then, Asian thought is more applicable to SOF than is Wes~ern. 
Special operations have been described as "a form of military 
judo,"39 an apt description in light of the previous assertions. 
It seems that martial arts, and perhaps martial qualities, which 
reflect and deflect tensions between humans at the personal 
conflict level, become tempered in American society. SOF operations 
demand an understanding of individual and group motivations, and 
they are likely to involve personal combat. Not surprisingly, 
many SOF personnel are not only trained extensively in hand-to-hand 
combat but also seem to operate with a philosophy similar to 
40 Asian martial artists. 
As an impetus to Asia's martial traditions, Sun Tzu's The 
Art of War could be considered the philosophical stimulus to 
special warfare. To quote Sun Tzu: 
All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when 
capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When 
near, make it appe!I that you are far away; when far away, 
that you are near. 
For Sun Tzu, weapons were less important than deception and 
attacking the enemy's strategy and mind: "weapons are ominous 
tools to be used only when there is no alternative.· 42 Sun Tzu 
could be considered the first written proponent of psychological 
39 Interview# 1, Wilson, op. cit •• 
40 The second part of this assertion must be considered 
speculation drawn from personal experiences and reflections from 
interviews with SOF soldiers. 
41 Sun Tzu, op. cit., P• 66. 
42 Sun Tzu, p.40. 
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warfare. He suggested that one should ·anger his general and 
confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance.· 43 
Considering longstanding American military successes and general 
battlefield superiority in Vietnam, it should be apparent that 
the National Liberation Front, General Giap, and the North Vietnamese 
Politburo understood Sun Tzu and the political and psychological 
dimensions of the Vietnam conflict. 
Long before American SOF or modern commandos emerged, Sun 
Tzu's philosophy had given rise to an unsual breed of adherents 
i J k - i . .44 n apan nown as n nJa. Their art of ninjitsu, also known 
as "the art of invisibility,• emphasized stealth and surprise, 
deception and diversion, patience and mental strength, and physical 
prowess. Ninja were utilized frequently by warlords during 
the internecine conflicts which shattered Japan between 1300-1700 
A.D •• They played roles as intelligence and counter-intelligence 
agents, assassins, terrorists, guerrillas, spearheads for conventional 
attacks, unconventional (behind~the-lines) forces, and psychological 
45 
warriors. 
Ninja, who were masters of a dizzying array of weaponry and 
a plethora of disguises, accomplished their wide variety of 
missions because they.were supremely flexible and adaptable 
43 Sun Tzu, p. 67. Samuel Griffith's commentary on P• 
53-54 gave me the clues. 
44 Though scholars have debated their origins, most believe 
that ninja found their principles through reading Sun Tzu. See 
chapter 1 of Andrew Adams, Ninja: The Invisible Assassins. Ohara 
Publications, Inc.: Los Angeles, CA, 1970. 
45 Ibid. 
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warriors. One day a ninja might appear as a priest, another as 
an itinerant farmer -- consider the similarity of the Viet Cong, 
farmer by day, guerrilla by night. Unlike revolutionaries, 
ninja were not absorbed by ideological and philosophical concerns, 
and they generally operated as direct action elements at the 
behest of the warlord who had their allegiance. 
Reviewing ninja roles and missions, it would seem that SOF 
have much more in common with these ancient shadow warriors than 
with modern conventional soldiers. Unlike the ninja, American 
SOF have adopted advisory roles in which nation-building efforts 
may require civic action and training missions. Nonetheless, Sun 
Tzu's aphorisms are as easily applied to SOF as to feudal Japanese 
ninja -- they certainly have not been lost on today's terrorists 
and guerrillas. A pertinent quote from Sun Tzu can be found for 
almost every SOF operating characteristic or individual trait 
discussed in this and the following chapter. 
While these characteristics are not representative of all 
those which distinguish SOF and conventional forces, they seem to 
be the most critical. Since SOF are dependent upon individuals 
and units which are characteristically small and elite, the third 
chapter will take a look at the type of individual involved in 
special operations. In the process, it will develop the traits 
and attributes which make the SOF soldier adaptable to changing 
requirements and new environments. 
Chapter III. The SOF Individual 
In special operations, the .individual is the essence of the 
operational art. Therefore, this chapter will attempt to outline 
the unusual traits which may best describe the SOF soldier and 
which seem to distinguish him from the conventional soldier. It 
will also examine distinctions within SOF which may provide a 
useful framework for analysis for determining how SOF assets are 
best applied to LIC. 
What attracts men to special operations forces? Is it the rugged 
training, the espirit de corps and elite nature, the challenges and 
built-in dangers of their missions, or a fierce warrior orientation? 
Or are they comfortable with an outlaw image as discussed in 
Chapter II, situated on the fringe of military norms? The answer 
lies probably in some combination of these factors coupled with a 
desire to exceed or to avoid what they may see as the l~aitations 
of modern conventional soldiering. 
SOF often attract the daring, the adventurous, the innovative, 
and the physically tough: a macho image, some would say self-image, 
surrounds these elite forces. The SOF mystique has captured the 
imagination of practitioners, proponents, and, periodically, the 
American public, just.as it did for SF benefactor John F. Kennedy.I 
To the detriment of SOF, this image can exceed reality and fuel 
misconceptions which are, in turn, perpetuated in the public mind 
1 Blaufarb's Counterinsurgency Era, Hilsman's To Move a 
Nation, Schlesinger's A Thousand Days, and Halberstam's The Best 
and the Brightest all discuss Kennedy's fascination (and the 
public's) with Special Forces. 
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and the military mainstream by films such as those of the Rambo 
Although SF has tried to lose the ·killer· image, the brutal 
commando skills and the v~olent aspects of their operations 
portrayed in films of this genre seem imbedded in our national 
consciousness. 2 The image has not been lost on conventional 
forces, either, who have often viewed SOF as ··~· g?od killers but 
bad officer candidates."3 Movies in which commandos eliminate 
guerrilla and terrorist "punks" (as would Dirty Harry with criminals) 
may serve as a societal catharsis for cultural frustrations 
over LIC, but they tend to reduce complex problems to a simplistic 
"good-guy, bad~guy" equation. An American "Manichean outlook,-
as one SOF proponent called it, may frustrate American efforts 
with LIC, because LIC cannot be reduced to such simplistic terms. 
David Halberstam wryly described SF as • ••• the extraordinary 
physical specimens and intellectual PhD's swinging from trees, 
speaking Russian and Chinese, eating snake meat and other fauna 
at night, springing counter-ambushes on unwary Asian ambushers 
who had read Mao and Giap but not Hilsman and Rostow.· 4 Certainly 
fanciful and somewhat tongue-in-cheek~ his words, nonetheless, 
probably mirrored an American public perception in the 1960's 
that SF were a sort of modern-day Daniel Boone. In that sense, 
2 Lt. Colonel Andrew S. Dulina, USA, PAO, 1st SOCOM, SF. 
Personal interview, Ft. Bragg, N.C.: November 9, 1985. 
3 Jannarone, op. cit., P• 10. 
4 Halberstam, op.cit., P• 154. 
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SF may have appealed to an American "frontier mentality" and a 
national self-image of an adaptable, resolute, and solution-oriented 
people. 5 In their heyday, SF developed a cult status -- a 
popular song and a movie starring John Wayne extolled their 
skills. Even G.I. Joe joined Special Forces. 6 Despite the 
absence of a public relations campaign as accompanied SF in the 
1960's and the extraordinary secrecy surrounding counter-terrorist 
units, it is intriguing that today's children thrill to a G.I. 
Joe doll who is a member of Delta Force. 
The modern "men of the Green Beret" are not much d~fferent 
from their 1960's predecessors, but today's SF have received far 
less publicity than they did during Kennedy's counterinsurgency 
era. The special warfare community has filled out and become 
more diverse since the first build-up, and it now encompasses a 
wide array of talented men. Why are these men, among our national 
military assets, most apt to discern important distinctions and 
function well in LIC situations? 
(1) SOF operate at the most personal levels of warfare. The SOF 
soldier's mindset and approach to problems is similar to 
the feudal Japanese ninja's. Like the ninja, the SOF soldier's 
training can be exceptionally demanding and harsh, so it promotes 
an attitude which can overcome the seeming insurmountable nature 
of some of his tasks. 
(2) Individuals and closely-knit teams comprise SOF. Self-reliance 
is their trademark, individualism a byproduct. 
5 Cohen, op. cit., P• 51. 
6 Duncan's New Legions, op.cit., stirred these personal 
recollections. 
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(3) Some SOF soldiers are attuned to a political, psychological, 
and social "feel" for their missions, a concept uncharacteristic 
of conventional forces. 
(4) Creativity and innovativeness are SOF hallmarks which may 
lead to friction with conventional forces by working against 
standard procedures and traditional viewpoints. 
(5) Operational and individual flexibility is endemic to SOF. 
They are unbound by tradition and adaptable to changing 
mission requirements and new tasks. 
Each of these traits will be reviewed carefully. 
(1) In describing the type of individual best suited to SF, Douglas 
Blaufarb noted that SF " ••• sought men ••• (who had) a liking for 
1 b .7 perso.na com at. In that sense, the conventional soldier may 
no longer be considered a true "warrior," since he is likely to 
be far removed from killing the enemy. Although he may be the 
arbiter of his own fate through manipulation of machinery, the 
conventional soldier is more dependent upon weapons technology 
than on human capabilities. Modern conventional warfare, it 
seems, has become so depersonalized that there is no need to 
"know the enemy," only to know his technical capabilities.8 
As modern warfare goes, then, SOF would seem to be an anach-
ronism, albeit with a modern twist. Although the SOF soldier may 
7 Blaufarb, op. cit., P• 79. 
8 See Gwynne Dyer's War, Dorsey Press: Homewood, IL, 
1985, pp. 156-172, which offers an interesting assessment of the 
changing roles of the soldier and the nature of the "military 
ethic" produced by the impact of modern technology on warfare. 
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engage in close-quarters combat, expectations placed on SOF (at 
least as applied to commando and counter-terror forces) have 
raised them, ironically, to a level of automaton-like efficiency 
which is quite impersonal. Before the advent of counter-terrorist 
units, however, Roger Beaumont discussed SF and other elites in 
the context of this cybernetic trend in his book, Military Elites.9 
In an age of revolution, terrorism, and subversion, the need for 
discrete applications of force, represented by the deadly efficiency 
of commando units such as Delta Force, British SAS, and German 
GSG9, may be said to be indicative of the conditions of our time. 
Nonetheless, SF and the non-combat SOF units need such except-
ional interpersonal skills and penetrating insight that a cybernetic 
label seems inappropriate to them. 
Chapter II drew parallels between special operations, the 
philosophy of Sun Tzu, and ninjitsu, asserting that ninja practi-
tioners are the historical antecedents to modern SOF. An aura 
of secrecy which surrounded the ninja warrior promoted misconceptions 
and elevated him to an almost mythological stature -- which held 
that the ninja was capable of flight, invisibility, and other 
superhuman feats. The ninja also exploited their knowledge of 
deception and diversion to contribute to their surreal image and 
effectiveness. For example, ninja frequently wore disguises and 
spread rumors and propaganda; they even played on popular Japanese 
9 Beaumont, op. cit., pp. 113-147, 191-192. 
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fears about demons by occasionally wearing devil masks. 10 Like 
modern counter-terrorist units and CIA operatives, ninja also 
relied heavily upon anonymity and secrecy. 
Germane to the conditions of civil war enveloping Japan at 
the time, ninja were incredibly well-rounded troops developed 
from Sun Tzu's emphasis on the utility of secret agents, what 
might be considered the original "Fifth Columnists.· 11 The 
ninja's incessant physical training and incredible variety of 
skills made him a combination of modern-day CIA case officer, 
SF soldier, and Ranger, a multi-talented individual who believed 
nothing to be impossible. 12 SOF origins and institutional development 
have organized SOF around certain specialties (despite the confusion 
discussed in Chapter I), just as ninja clans specialized in 
~ 
different aspects of ninjitsu. Nonetheless, a cross-section of 
SOF skills bears a remarkable resemblance in toto to the more 
holistic art of ninjitsu. 
(2) SOF are made up of closely-knit, highly-integrated tea•s which 
require soldiers to have a refined sense of teamwork and an 
ability to complement others' special skills. Coordinated effort 
is the essence of strike and counter-terror operations performed 
10 See Adams, op. cit.. Similarly, General Blackburn's 
WWII guerrillas in Luzon stirred up local fears about vampires by 
puncturing the necks of dead Japanese soldiers. From interview, 
Blackburn, op. cit •• 
11 Sun Tzu, op. cit., pp. 146-149. 
12 Adams, op. cit., P• 106. 
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by Rangers, SEALs, or Delta Force. SF is organized around the 
nucleus of a twelve-man A-Team. Since SF cross-train in another 
specialty and may require wide latitude in the field, a self-reliant 
individual may be even more important to SF than to strike forces. 
According to a British SAS soldier, the SAS considers self--
reliance critical to special operations success because soldiers 
exhibiting this trait usually work equally well individually or 
in groups. 13 In special operations, operators may be distanced 
from the command and control mechanism, wield great field authority, 
and lack an outside support network, so for all SOF endeavors, 
self-reliance is a singularly important individual attribute. 
This SOF trait, however, can lead to a feeling of independence 
or individualism uncommon to conventional forces. SOF soldiers 
have been known to refuse orders on occasion; they may ask for 
such refined operational details that SOF may seem to be "splitting 
hairs,· but the nature of their operations demands precision and 
14 precise detail. Some of these instances undoubtedly have 
resulted from a conventional misunderstanding of SOF capabilities, 
but, to be sure, uncooperative and super-inquisitive SOF soldiers 
have probably aroused conventional antipathy toward SOF. 
Besides an independent orientation, SOF soldiers may retain 
an individualism which runs counter to a conventional training 
process that strips individual civilian identities and encourages 
13 Major John Holmes, SAS liaison at the British Embassy, 
Personal Interview, Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1985. 
14 Interview, Farrell, op. cit •• Also, interview, Custer, 
op. cit •• 
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. 15 identification with the group and the greater whole of the service. 
Elite forces seem to provide outlets for individualists who 
might see themselves encumbered by a ponderous and stratified 
bureaucracy. This attraction leads SOF soldiers to eschew what 
they would consider to be some of the more mundane tasks of modern 
conventional soldiering such as management and finance. An 
overwhelming mission orientation, a common trait among SOF soldiers, 
drives SOF to associate with like-minded thinkers and paradoxically 
propels them away from the very skills they need to promote their 
acceptance by the mainstream. 
(3) Because special operations requirements continually evolve, 
the special operator tends to be an innovator who sometimes 
circumnavigates bureaucratic impediments to secure his needs. 
For example, Air Force SOF at the "skunk works" of Hurlburt Field 
have developed much.of the specialized radio equipment used by 
SOF airmen. 16 Likewise, for the Son Tay raid and the Iran 
rescue operation, SOF soldiers modified existing equipment such. 
as M-79 grenade vests and ordered other special gear, relying 
heavily on the Sears and Roebuck catalogue and other outside 
15 See Duncan, op. cit •• His description of the dehumanizing 
induction and training process is interesting -- but he omits 
discussion of the distinguishing character of the SF soldier. 
See also Dyer, Chapter 5, op. cit •• 
16 
"Skunk Works· Armed Forces Journal International, June 
1986, PP• 76-77. Similarly, an Army SOF aviator pointed out a 
strut which he had modified for the UH-60 Blackhawk used for SOF 
missions and informed me that Army SOF aviators often have developed 
features for SOF missions which the aircraft manufacturers overlooked. 
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sources.17 As suggested in Chapter II, against a relatively 
inflexible bureaucratic backdrop, SOF creativity can prove irksome 
to soldiers accustomed to going "by-the-book." 
SOF operators are also known for their creative and intelligent 
approaches to field mission requirements. One well-publicized 
example is that of the Ranger officer during the Grenada operation 
who, unable to communicate through his radio equipment, called in 
fire support by dialing Fort Bragg on AT&T telephone lines. In 
the conventional military, soldiers are taught to follow the 
manual, not to arrive at their own conclusions or to develop 
their own solutions; SOF self-reliance encourages individual 
initiative. As one SOF soldier put it, "the U.S. Army does not 
recognize brilliance or individuals ••• it does not teach its 
soldiers to think." 18 His assertion was not meant to be harsh or 
immodest, merely to indicate that a significant difference between 
SOF and conventional forces is that SOF allow far more room for 
individual creativity and thought. As pointed out in Chapter II, 
SOF rely on NCO's and enlisted men for their operations. Therefore, 
these individuals must be intellectually capable of analyzing 
complex problems and attempting to find solutions for them, 
sometimes in the field. 
(4) Because SOF soldiers in SF, PSYOPs, and Civil Affairs tend 
17 For examples, see Schemmer, op. cit., and Beckwith, op. 
cit •• 
18 Non-attributable interview. 
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to be adept at assimilating foreign cultures, they may be asked 
to promote harmony between host governments, military forces, and 
indigenous populations. SOF individuals often develop a feel for 
the political, social, and psychological nuances of their operational 
areas. SF and Civil Affairs troops may adopt local customs or 
participate in local rituals periodically to improve interaction 
with indigenous peoples. For instance, SF soldiers working with 
the Montagnards of South Vietnam often wore jewelry which was 
given to them as a gift to symbolize the friendship between the 
tribe and the Americans. Such adornments often met with scorn 
from conventional forces in Vietnam. 19 
SOF sometimes delve into subject areas not normally asssociated 
with the military domain. For example, the author once listened 
to two SF NCO's carrying on a highly-articulate discussion about 
religion in the Third World. In dealing with foreign nationals, 
conventional soldiers would be less likely than SOF to take 
non-military factors such as religion into account. Sensitivity 
to tribal idiosyncracies and what may seem to be minor local 
considerations could be essential to the success of SF, PSYOPs, 
and Civil Affairs missions. 
Patience is an important trait for SOF in advisory roles, 
one more common to SF and Civil Affairs soldiers than to strike 
19 Interview, Lunger, op. cit •• Durittg Vietnam, many 
conventional officers were also frustrated by the unkempt and 
'"uµmilitary" appearances of SF troops, referring to them disparagingly 
as "long hairs.· Perhaps they meant to equate SF with the counter-
culture hippies, who tended to be anti-establishment and anti-
military. 
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forces; a cultural perception that American "know-how" is preeminent 
stimulates a dilemma as to whether Americans should take the lead 
and dominate host approaches or allow an indigenous solution to 
problem areas. Long-term cross-cultural contact, particularly in 
a hostile environment, requires a special breed of soldier who 
reflects and thinks carefully before he acts. Patience, then, 
should be sought as a distinctive individual trait in selecting 
men for advisory roles in protracted conflicts, mobile training 
d . i i . 20 teams, an civ c act on proJects. 
(5) In special operations, each operation is likely to be a 
completely new enterprise, a unique experience which may make 
irrelevant preparations based on previous operations. Without a 
flexibility of mind and doctrine, SOF may be locked into essentially 
bureaucratic approaches, a formula which could lead to disaster 
in special operations. Among SOF traits, flexibility and adaptability 
are the most important to this study. 
In their advisory role, SOF are the "eyes and ears" of an 
American presence, functioning, as suggested in Chapter II, like 
CIA-field operatives. When SOF are assigned to CIA operational 
control, flexibility is needed for a dual allegiance and adaptability 
for interaction with civilian professionals. Even when that 
situation does not exist, SOF must breach traditional reconn-
aissance concepts to act symbiotically with intelligence assets 
in discerning and reporting field developments. Adapting to 
20 Barnett, op. cit., p. 224. 
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intelligence roles in a foreign environment can be difficult, but 
SOF soldiers have accomplished the transition many times.21 
SOF have usually adapted to new missions successfully, even 
those far apart from their conceptual basis. For example, SF 
elements were specially trained for the Son Tay raid in 1970; 
more recently, an SF contingent under the command of Colonel 
Robert Kountel was organized for counter-terror missions during 
the interim development of Delta Force. As Chapter I emphasized, 
Ranger concepts have been so intermingled with those of SF that 
commando operations are of ten assumed to be an integral part of the 
SF mission. But as other authors have pointed out, alternative 
forces were unavailable at those junctures where specialized 
missions were needed, so SF seemed to be the logical choice for the 
operations. 
The nature of Ranger and other strike operations seems 
to encourage an aggressive approach among these forces, .but we 
should not assume that they may adopt the ·1et's get on with it• 
attitude, for Rangers have proven to be patient, reflective, and 
adaptable as well. For example, at least one Ranger battalion 
now trains in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla tactics (though not 
organization and training of such forces as conducted by SF).22 
Moreover, some Rangers have cross-trained with SF, earning both 
21 
22 
Ibid., PP• 187-190. 
Gung-Ho, op. cit., pp. 82-83. 
23 the Ranger tab and the SF beret. 
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On the whole, however, SF soldiers tend to be older, wiser, 
more reflective, and more aware of the political nature of special 
operations than are Rangers. 24 That is not to say that SF are 
better soldiers, just that there are often age and experience 
differences between these forces which suit SF for advisory roles 
in protracted conflicts. In contrast, direct action missions in 
most cases would best be conducted by Rangers and other strike forces. 
Although there are organizational and operational differences 
between SF and Rangers, their talents are not mutually exclusive. 
Individual cases support this notion. For example, Colonel 
Charlie Beckwith commanded line (conventional) units, wa~ commandant 
of the Ranger school, worked in SF, and oversaw the development 
of De·lta Force. 25 To fill such a variety of roles, he must have 
been quite adaptable. Lt. Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons, who had 
a Ranger background and led some Asian theater commando operations 
in WWII, ran the clandestine White Star program in Laos in 1959-60 
and later led the raid on Son Tay prison in 1970. After his military 
retirement, Colonel Simons would lead a group of civilians into 
Iran on a celebrated mission to free two illegally detained 
employees of an American corporation. If the portrayal of Colonel 
Simons in a popular book is accurate, he was an extremely adaptable 
23 Captain Benjamin Weiss, U.S. Army Rangers, USJFKSWC, 
Personal interview. Fort Bragg, NC: November 7, 1985. 
24 Interview# 2, Wilson, op. cit •• 
25 See Beckwith, op. cit •• 
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individual, especially considering that his role in Iran was not 
military in orientation.26 
The incredible operational detail needed for raids and 
other SOF missions demands flexibility, for special operations 
requirements are difficult to forecast. Indeed, a miscalculation 
during the Son Tay mission landed part of the assault force in 
the wrong compound, but both assault teams reacted calmly and 
carried on with their missions. 27 American approaches to special 
operations have been noted for their ad~ nature, that is, 
capabilities and coordination have been developed from a standing 
start, especially for the hostage rescue/counter-terror mission. 
It may be that American culture contributes to ad .!!.2.£ approaches 
to special operations, for we seem to be an impatient people who 
woul~ rather not tackle the fine operational detail needed for 
direct action missions and the frustrations which may ensue from 
advisory missions in foreign lands. 
The flexibility of SOF individuals and units dovetails 
nicely with adaptability and improves the prospects for success 
in special operations missions. U~til recently, however, the 
lack of a joint training and command· structure for SOF units has 
failed to maximize SOF flexibility and adaptability. Such an 
organization now exists (JSOC), but it is oriented primarily 
toward direct action counte~terrorist missions, which are only 
26 See Ken Follett. On Wings of Eagles. New American Library: 
New York, 1984, PP• 56-57. For further insight into Simons, also 
see Schemmer, op. cit •• 
27 See Schemmer, op. cit •• 
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one facet of the LIC challenge. 
The SOF attributes or traits discussed in this chapter could 
have served as the basis for the entire thesis, but alone they 
explain only part of a complex issue. As the introduction and 
earlier chapters have suggested, LIC and special operations are 
closely tied to the efforts of individuals, so it is imperative 
that we understand personal traits which tend to distinguish SOF 
from other DoD forces and which make SOF suitable for LIC. For 
the SOF selection process, certain attributes are more desirable 
than others and should be the subject of careful analysis. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Since Chapter III addressed SOF traits, it is appropriate 
to begin this final section with an examination of the SOF selection 
process. In an historical sense, the 1980's military build-up 
presents similarities to that of the 1960's, because both relied 
on solid backing by political proponents, including White House 
supporters, and have been characterized by a relatively quick 
expansionary process (the current expansion is ongoing). Some 
SOF advocates feel that the recruitment of large numbers of new 
troops may detract from the quality of soldier selected for SOF, 
and they argue that special operations is a sophisticated, pro-
fessional enterprise ill-suited to amateurs. SF probably suffered 
this overexpansionary fate in the 1960's1 as it ballooned from 
1500 to 9000 soldiers in one year. 1 One author has suggested 
that many SF soldiers of the 1960's "deplored the fast build-up, 
the lowering of standards, the end of exclusivity, the publicity, 
the destruction of eliteness except in name.· 2 
Some observers have suggested that elites by their nature 
cannot be so large anyway, arguing that at some point quality 
suffers and effectiveness declines. 3 It seems that the talents 
needed to fulfill SOF expansionary goals exist in our society, 
but the qualities which SOF seek are not those ordinarily found 
in conventional forces. Even when desirable SOF traits are found 
1 Russell F. Weigley. History of the United States Army. 
The MacMillan Company: New York, 1967, p. 432. 
2 Duncan, op. cit., p. 195. 
3 Interviews, Farrell, Wilson I 2, op. cit •• 
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in line unit soldiers, they may be camoflauged by the requirements 
of conventional and strategic warfare, or those individuals 
may be inaccessable to SOF recruiters. For example, when the 
Iran mission requirements dictated that Delta Force acquire a 
soldier fluent in Farsi who could serve as a DoD penetration 
agent, an Air Force sergeant was discovered who fit their needs.4 
The search for such an individual, however, was expedited because 
the hostage matter was considered one of national urgency. 
During non-crisis periods, the military recruitment pool is 
unlikely to be so open. 
SOF should seek particularly needed skills from a broader 
cross-section of the population outside of the military, including 
from government bureaucracies. Useful linguistic capabilities and 
applicable ethnic backgrounds should be sought (e.g., Hispanic 
community for Latin America orientation), especially for PSYOPs, 
Civil Affairs, and SF. Perhaps even women should be recruited 
for some roles in which there is little likelihood of combat. In 
that sense, Donald Duncan's assertion that SF recruitment in the 
1960's was deliberately discriminatory against blacks is alarming 
such a bias would eliminate an important recruiting base and 
it would obviously violate civil righ~s legislation. 5 Though 
bureaucratic and institutional impediments might stifle creative 
recruiting approaches, SOF proponents should consider any novel 
4 Beckwith, op. cit., p. 212. As Beckwith noted, this 
individual demonstrated great courage (and adaptability as well), 
for he had no prior SOF or intelligence experience. 
5 Duncan, op. cit., pp. 195-197. 
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and feasible recruiting efforts to expand their potential manpower 
base while avoiding a high-profile recruiting effort (as in the 
1960's) which might seem to compete with the mainstream. 
Since these elite forces are likely to be utilized and may 
be depleted in conflict situations, they can suffer from what 
Roger Beaumont called the ·selection-destruction cycle.·6 An 
example of Beaumont's cycle would be the use of SF in Vietnam on 
high-risk combat missions and in village defense operations 
against numerically superior NLF/NVA forces. These missions 
killed off many highly-skilled SF soldiers. As Bernard Fall 
concluded, "A dead Special Forces sergeant is not spontaneously 
replaced by his own social environment. A dead revolutionary 
usually is.·7 To avoid unnecessary attrition of SOF talent and 
to employ them with wisdom, political and military leadership 
must be aware of the unique qualities and capabilities which 
characterize SOF. 
As Colonel Beckwith demonstrated with Delta Force recruitment, 
the SOF selection process can be improved by the formulation of a 
psychological profile and a list of desirable attributes sought 
for the various SOF units. Such a profile might be enhanced by 
the study of common philosophical ground shared by the Japanese 
ninja and SOF. Although all three chapters of this thesis have 
6 Beaumont, op. cit., pp. 181-183. 
7 Bernard Fall. Street Without Joy. The Stackpole Company: 
Harrisburg, PA, 1963, p. 357. As quoted in Sam Sarkesian, "Amerian 
Policy on Revolution and Counterrevolution: A Synthesis of the 
Literature and Concepts.· Unpublished manuscript, n.d., p. 9. 
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pointed out distinctions within the U.S. special warfare community 
and identified peculiarities of SOF units, it may also be that many 
SOF skills could be consolidated and integrated, as with the 
British SAS and SBS (Special Boat Service), which perform operations 
similar to those of the Delta Force, Rangers, and SEALs. Like SAS, 
American SOF could move through training rotations, for example, 
six months in counter-terrorism (shooting house drills, etc.). 
and another six months in reconnaissance and intelligence collection.8 
Despite some concerns that certain missions may require great special-
ization (e.g., counter-terror), this tendency may actually detract 
from American SOF capabiblities, because it pools too many talented 
individuals who conceivably could take on other missions. In 
that sense, the development of a more holistic approach to SOF 
skills may be beneficial. 
Obviously, the difficult skills required for SOF aviation 
would not be easily transferable nor would those of PSYOPs and 
Civil Affairs forces. The latter two groups are too lean already 
considering the vastness of LIC~ and they must be brought into the 
mainstream of the current SOF renaissance -- even though they do 
not fit traditional conceptions of special operations and may 
develop as entities distinct from other SOF. Although integration 
might serve as a long~range boost to U.S. special operations 
capabilities, parochialism, institutional longevity, and pride might 
preclude such an effort. On the other hand, LIC challenges 
probably can be handled effectively by the current array of 
8 Interview, Lunger, op. cit •• 
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forces, assuming a completion of Secretary Weinberger's mandated 
expansion, organizational improv~ments, and a conceptual synthesis 
at the National Security Council level. 
The above requirements will be difficult to achieve, primarily 
because the DoD under which SOF are subsumed places strategic and 
conventional warfare at the top of its list of priorities. Due 
to a highly capable Soviet strategic and conventional threat to 
U.S. national security, DoD concerns are realistically skewed 
toward high-intensity missions. In that context, SOF are assign-
ed important tactical and strategic roles, but "dual-hatting• SOF 
units with LIC and high-intensity missions may detract from 
preparations for either. Perhaps certain special warfare units 
could be designated and trained specifically for conventional 
conflicts, and, if necessary, provide support for SOF units in 
low-intensity activities. As General Yarborough put it, -Training 
for the conventional mission is a full-time job.·9 The same 
logic could be applied to SOF preparations for LIC. 
SOF may not even be the on1y military forces required for 
effective U.S. approaches to LIC; as the conflict scale moves 
upward, conventional forces such as Marines, airborne units, Army 
light infantry divisions, or forces attached to the USCENTCOM 
(formerly the Rapid D~ployment Joint Task Force), may prove 
useful for situations in which low-profile special operations 
cannot defend U.S. strategic interests. Just as SOF would support 
conventional combat operations in wartime, conventional forces 
9 Interview, Yarborough, op. cit •• 
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may be needed to support SOF or even to resolve certain problems, 
such as the Navy's satisfactory role in ending the Achille Lauro 
episode. On the lower end of the spectrum, SOF are only the 
military part of a synergistic approach which requires a close 
coordination between SOF, intelligence assets, and other U.S. 
government agencies which may play roles abroad. At all conflict 
levels, there must be pre-existing relationships and thorough 
interaction between government agencies, SOF, and conventional 
forces so that smooth transitions from one emphasis to another 
can be effected. 
As with the relationship between conventional warfare and 
tactical nuclear war, no line of demarcation clearly separates 
LIC from either peace or conventional warfare. Since Americans 
seem to be obsessed by categories and classification, we would 
like
0
to "pigeonhole· each challenge. Our chief adversary, the 
Soviets, sees no such distinctions, preferring to view warfare in 
its totality. Leninist political warfare, then, reflects the 
state of "peace,· a Byzantine concept which is totally alien 
to Americans who tend to view warfare as a black and white dichotomy. 
In American minds, the nation is either at war or at peace. It 
is time to shed this simplistic perspective in favor of a realistic 
appraisal of the changes which have occurred since World War II. 
As Colonel Dallas Cox put it, ·we~ at war now.·10 
Director of Central Intelligence William Casey has argued 
IO Colonel Dallas Cox, JSOA, Army Special Forces, Personal 
Interview: Washington, D.C., October 17,1985. 
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that the Soviets are utilizing a resource war strategy in which 
surrogate entities wage covert warfare against the United States.11 
Likewise, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA (ret'd), has argued to the 
effect that Soviet strategy is maritime in orientation and aimed 
at critical chokepoints on world sealanes which could deny resources 
to the United States. 12 What these men are saying is that the 
Soviets have adapted to world changes and are employing a complex 
strategy which has a definite LIC component. The Soviets probably 
have little desire or reason to engage us directly, where we are 
strong. Sun Tzu said, "When he concentrates, prepare against 
him; where he is strong, avoid him.·l3 Our deterrence strategy, 
in its conventional and strategic sense, has worked, and we have 
avoided ·war· as we understand it. But Sun Tzu al•o said: 
To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles 
is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without 
fighting is the acme of skill •••• Thus, those skilled in 
war subdue the enemy's army without battle.14 
This seems to be the essence of Soviet strategy toward the United 
States. 
To our detriment, no single organization currently has 




"Casey Speaks on Intelligence Role in Countering Terrorism,· 
Intelligence Literary Scene. National Intelligence Study 
Publisher. Washington, D.C.: January 1986. 
' 12 Interview I 1, Wilson, op. cit •• See also Barnett, op. 
cit., PP• 191-194. 
13 P• 67, Sun Tzu, op. cit •• 
14 Sun Tzu, PP• 77, 79. 
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LIC, because it is a still-evolving phenomenon full of ambiguity 
and tied closely to political change. Dr. Sam Sarkesian has 
suggested a number of organizational changes which could vastly 
improve U.S. cabilities for coordinating its assets for Lic.15 
Yet, without strategic vision, an organizational "fix" may prove 
to be ineffective. The American people, its leaders, and the 
pluralist system do not seem well-suited to seeking long-term 
goals. A centralized system such as that of the Soviet Union 
probably finds the task far less foreboding. Moreover, our own 
preconceptions make it difficult to accept that other nations may 
have strategic aims, long-term plans, or visions of the future. 
To affect these built-in limitations, only effective American 
leadership can clearly convey the national security ramifications 
of LIC to the American public and stimulate the development 
of a·successful approach. 
In the 1960's, the Army's Special Forces probably appealed 
to another American peculiarity, a problem-solving mentality 
which drives a cultural perception that our national resources 
(human and technical) can reduce any problem to its essentials 
and solve it.1 6 LIC may prove to be insoluble, so we should not 
look on SOF as a panacea for or solution to LIC challenges. 
American culture also seems to yearn for distinct endings, a 
tendency especially evident when its military forces are committed 
to conflicts. A "win v. lose· notion eschewing any middle ground 
15 
16 
See the several publications of Sarkesian, all op. cit •• 
Cohen, op. cit., PP• 86-87. 
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will frustrate American approaches to LIC, which may not have a 
distinct ending or allow the emergence of clear winners or losers. 
The deterrence concept, usually discussed in the strategic warfare 
context, may be difficult to apply to LIC because cost-benefit 
ratios cannot be weighed easily at the lower end of the conflict 
spectrum. Yet, sophisticated skills for LIC could preclude the 
breakout of higher-intensity conflicts, so "deterrence" need not 
disappear from the lexicon at low conflict levels. LIC could be 
described as a problem of "conflict management," as international 
relationists have put it, in which we strive to keep conflict 
problems at or below a simmering point. 
SOF have been at the forefront of U.S. efforts to cope with 
newly perceived threats, an unsurprising situation given their 
adaptability. Yet, no employaent strategy has accompanied SOF 
expa~sions toward those threats. It is possible that the SOF 
adaptability trait has reduced the likelihood of the development 
of an employment strategy since SOF seem to fill preparedness 
gaps somewhat amorphously. The underlying reason for a lack of 
strategy is probably that despite a SOF "feel" for the political 
and psychological aspects of LIC,'these forces cannot develop a 
strategy on their own. The U.S. Department of State, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and all relevant government agencies must be 
brought to bear on this problem with some form of coordinated 
effort. 
As with the British SAS, American SOF go through a continuous 
process of justifying their existence, because they seem to need 
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a raison d'etre. As suggested earlier, this process might be tied 
to the cyclical developments of SOF and perhaps to periodically 
aggressive U.S. foreign policies. Both the current and 1960's 
periods have been marked by an overwhelmingly singular focus --
at the expense of viewing the totality of the problem. For SF in 
the 1960's, revolution and counter-insurgency ·were the watchwords; 
in the 1980's, terrorism has impelled the development of Delta 
Force, a counter-terror SEAL team, and a joint command for strike 
assets. 
This myopic approach seems to appeal to the American public, 
which apparently needs to perceive a concrete threat (i.e., the 
terrorists are out to get us). Even during Vietnam, government 
reports emphasized the terror aspect of VC operations, often 
ignoring their political and civic action efforts as though the 
NLF ~ould have had no appeal without the effective use of terrorism. 
If we maintain this limited perspective, we will continue to 
have serious problems with future conflicts, especially when we 
attempt to support counter-revolutionary systems fighting communist 
cadres. 
The argument of this paper is not that a conventionally and 
strategically oriented DoD is incapable of successfully integrating 
its assets for LIC. Nor does it contend that the skills required 
for LIC cannot be found among or developed by conventional soldiers. 
But the American military reflects the mainstream of the society 
that spawns it, so cultural notions support traditional conventional 
military outlooks and discourage an understanding of unclear 
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threats. 
SOF defy the unknown and risk the unattempted, and they have 
found themselves on the cutting edge of approaches to new challenges. 
LIC is that new challenge. It is complex; it is difficult; it 
demands sophistication. Sun Tzu would have understood it instinct-
ively. Some analysts feel that LIC is an abominable term, more likely 
to confuse than to clarify. But the phrase at least gives us a 
starting point and some frame of reference, a simple one which 
the American public might grasp. Special Operations Forces are 
a foundation upon which to build many of the skills needed to 
cope with low-intensity conflict, and they already represent our 
best military assets for dealing with this present and future 
danger. 
Soviet LIC strategy is ominous. The U.S. would do well to 
heed. Sun Tzu's counsel that "what is of supreme importance in war 
is to attack the enemy's strategy.• In the final analysis, 
however, our fate lies in our hands, not theirs. Pericles, the 
Athenian hero of Thucydide's Peloponnesian Wars, once addressed the 
Spartan maritime strategy by saying that "it is not the enemy's 
devices but our own blunders that we should fear most." 
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